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ORIGINALISM AND THE UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION
Lawrence B. Solum**
In his book, America’s Unwritten Constitution, Akhil Reed
Amar contends that to properly engage the written Constitution,
scholars and laymen alike must look to extratextual sources: among
them America’s founding documents, institutional practices, and
ethos, all of which constitute Amar’s “unwritten Constitution.” In
this Article, I argue that contemporary originalist constitutional theory is consistent with reliance on extraconstitutional sources in certain
circumstances. I establish a framework for revaluating the use of extratextual sources. That framework categorizes extratextual sources
and explains their relevance to constitutional interpretation (the
meaning of the text) and constitutional construction (elaboration of
constitutional doctrine and decision of constitutional cases). I conclude by applying the framework to a question posed by Akhil Amar:
Can vice presidents preside over their own trial upon impeachment?
A negative answer to this question is consistent with an originalist
constitutional theory that carefully cabins the use of extratextual
sources in constitutional interpretation and construction.
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF AN UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION
FOR ORIGINALISTS

In 1975, Thomas Grey asked, “Do we have an unwritten constitution?”1 His question has been echoed by Michael Moore,2 Antonin Scalia,3 and others.4 Recently, Akhil Amar has provided his own distinctive
* (c) 2012 by the Author. Permission is hereby granted to make copies in tangible or electronic form, including but not limited to the distribution of this work in whole or in part for educational or
scholarly purposes.
** John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703 (1975).
2. Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 107, 107
(1989).
3. Antonin Scalia, Is There an Unwritten Constitution?, 12 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (1989).
4. The literature on unwritten constitutions, unenumerated constitutional rights, the Ninth
Amendment, and related topics is vast. Some of the work that influenced the writing of this Article in
particular include: Jed Rubenfeld, The New Unwritten Constitution, 51 DUKE L.J. 289 (2001); Suzana
Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987); Adrian Vermeule, The
Facts About Unwritten Constitutionalism: A Response to Professor Rubenfeld, 51 DUKE L.J. 473
(2001).
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answer to Grey’s question in America’s Unwritten Constitution.5 One of
the motivations for Grey’s essay was the early stirrings of originalism; descendants of the interpretivism and textualism that Grey interrogated
now occupy center stage in contemporary debates about constitutional
theory. But since Grey wrote his essay, originalism and textualism have
evolved. This Article addresses the idea of an unwritten constitution
from the perspective of contemporary originalist theory. Is the notion of
an unwritten constitution consistent with the originalist claim that constitutional practice should be constrained by the original public meaning of
the constitutional text?
We can begin with a preliminary statement of the problem as the
conjunction of three propositions: (1) The predominate form of contemporary originalism is textualist; let’s call this form of originalism “public
meaning originalism.” (2) An unwritten constitution is not a text. (3)
Therefore, public meaning originalists should reject the notion of an unwritten constitution.
This simple syllogism6 is misleading, in part because the phrase
“unwritten Constitution” provides an unfortunate frame for the real issues at hand. The United States does not have an unwritten constitution
in the same sense that the United Kingdom does—no one seriously disputes that claim (if it is understood narrowly). And even the United
Kingdom has a constitution comprised largely of writings—although the
writings are not an integrated document but are instead a collection of
statutes, royal proclamations, and many other texts. Opponents of an
unwritten constitution do not dispute the existence of judicial decisions
that create or articulate rules of constitutional law. In some senses, we
do have an unwritten constitution. In other senses, we do not. Framing
the issues in terms of the notion of an “unwritten constitution” obscures
rather than illuminates the questions that are at stake.
In this Article, we will use a substitute vocabulary. The phrase “extratextual sources” will be used to designate sources of constitutional law
that are outside the complete text of the U.S. Constitution (as amended).
One incomplete version is under glass in the national archives; complete
versions with the amendments can be found in the U.S. Code and on the
Internet. Extratextual sources include judicial opinions, the Articles of
Confederation, the Declaration of Independence, the ethos of the Framing era, theories of justice, the Northwest Ordinance, and the historical
practices of the institutions of government and the American people—
and many other things as well.
Here is the plan. In Part II, I will attempt to concisely formulate the
core of originalism as a constitutional theory. Part III will address extraconstitutional sources, laying out a typology of the sources themselves
5. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRICIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012).
6. The word “syllogism” is used loosely: as stated, the argument is enthymematic, although the
true syllogistic version could easily be stated.

SOLUM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 5]

10/21/2013 10:51 AM

ORIGINALISM & THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION

1937

and the roles that they can play in constitutional interpretation and construction. Part IV will then examine particular extratextual sources from
an originalist perspective. Part V concludes.
II. ORIGINALISM
Our topic is the relationship between originalism and extratextual
sources of constitutional law. We can begin by asking the question,
“What is originalism?”
A.

Communicative Content and Legal Content

Let me begin with a very general distinction in legal theory—the
distinction between “legal content” and “communicative content.”7 As
applied to the Constitution, this distinction marks the difference between
the legal content of constitutional doctrine and norms, on the one hand,
and the communicative content (linguistic meaning in context) of the
constitutional text, on the other hand. This distinction is fundamental to
our investigation of the relationship between originalism and extratextual sources of constitutional norms, and we need to be clear and precise
about these foundational ideas before we proceed further.
Let’s begin with the idea of “communicative content.” The “communicative content” of a legal text is its “meaning.” But the word
“meaning,” standing alone is ambiguous. When we ask the question
“what does this clause of the Constitution mean?,” we might be asking
about the linguistic meaning of the words—but we also might be asking
about the effect that provision will have, or about the content of the doctrines of constitutional law that implement the clause. “Communicative
content” refers to what we can roughly call the “linguistic meaning” of
the text in the context in which it was framed and ratified. This rough
and ready notion of communicative content is good enough for many
purposes, but we can be a bit more precise.
How does a legal text (e.g., the Constitution) communicate? One
part of the answer to that question focuses on the semantic meaning of
the words and phrases that make up the text. If we want to know the
meaning of the Commerce Clause, we need to know the meaning of the
words in each clause: for example, the Commerce Clause includes the
words “regulate,” “commerce,” “among,” “several,” and “states.”8
Words have conventional semantic meanings—meanings that are determined by patterns of usage that produce shared linguistic conventions.
But the meaning of a clause (or a sentence in ordinary English) is
not determined by the meaning of the words alone. There are further
conventions, regularities in usage that determine the way words combine
to produce meanings. We sometimes call these regularities “rules” of
7. See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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grammar and syntax, but the term “rule” is somewhat misleading because it suggests that the regularities must conform to a prescriptive rule.
Failure to conform would then constitute a violation—what we sometimes call a “grammatical error.” Syntax and grammar enable meaning
because of regularities in usage. Communication can take advantage of
those regularities in various ways (not just by strict adherence to a
“rule”) and the regularities are not necessarily fully captured by the idea
of a rule—there may be clusters and variations that are comprehended
by competent speakers of the language.
The principle of compositionality expresses the idea that part of the
meaning of an utterance (e.g., a clause in the Constitution) is the product
of the conventional semantic meaning of the words, and the regularities
of syntax and grammar that combine them.9 The contribution made by
conventional semantic meanings, syntax, and grammar to the full communicative content of an utterance can be called its “semantic content.”
Lawyers sometimes call the semantic content of a statute its “literal
meaning.” In theoretical linguistics and the philosophy of language, the
terms “syntax” and “semantics” are used to refer to the investigation of
this component of meaning.
But the semantic content of an utterance does not do all the work.
The meaning of a sentence is not always its “literal meaning.” Words are
uttered (or authored) in a context. This sentence (in this paper) provides
a trivial example of the contribution made by context to meaning. The
sentence immediately prior to this one (beginning “This sentence. . .”)
uses the word “this” in two places (“this sentence” and “this paper”).
The word “this” is an indexical.10 Indexicals have conventional semantic
meanings. Competent speakers of English understand words like “this,”
“here,” “now,” and so forth. But they would not know what “this” is, or
where “here” is, or when “now” is, unless they had information about the
context in which these words were uttered. Or take the word “Senate”
as that word is used in the U.S. Constitution.11 Acontextually, “Senate”
might mean “an assembly of citizens” or “the building in which a legislative assembly meets” or “the deliberative body of a college or university
faculty.” But in context, the word “Senate” refers to a particular legislative body created by the Constitution itself—the Senate of the United
States that is part of the U.S. Congress created by the Constitution of
1789.
These examples of the contribution that context makes to meaning
may seem trivial. There is nothing complex or counterintuitive about the
examples—they are easy cases! But the intuitively obvious nature of
9. DONALD DAVIDSON, THEORIES OF MEANING AND LEARNABLE LANGUAGES (1965), reprinted in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 3, 7–13 (2d ed. 2001); Richard E. Grandy,
Understanding and the Principle of Compositionality, 4 PHIL. PERSP. 557, 560 (1990).
10. See David Braun, Indexicals, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 15, 2007), http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/; see also John Perry, Indexicals and Demonstratives, in A COMPANION
TO PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 586–612 (Bob Hale & Crispin Wright eds. 1997).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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these examples is what makes them so powerful. They show beyond
doubt that the communicative content of an utterance cannot be reduced
to its semantic content. When it comes to the contribution that context
makes to meaning, the case of legal texts is complex. For example, the
clauses of the U.S. Constitution are embedded in multiple layers of context. Take the Constitution of 1789 (as it existed before amendment).
Each Clause is embedded in a surrounding Article, and the Articles are
embedded in the whole Constitution, which has a Preamble. The Constitution was framed and then ratified in a particular historical context.
Some portion of the total context was shared in that it was generally
available to the Framers, ratifiers, and citizens during the period of ratification. Call this common source of meaning “the publicly available context of constitutional communication” (or “the publicly available context” for short). This publicly available context combines with the
semantic meaning of the words and phrases to produce the “communicative content” of the constitutional text.
Philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics use the word
“pragmatics” to designate the study of the effect of context on communicative content.12 The contribution that context makes to communicative
content can be called “pragmatic enrichment,” but for our purposes we
can use the phrase “contextual enrichment” to refer to this idea.
We can illustrate the idea of communicative content with an example. Take the free speech provision of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. The semantic content (or “literal meaning”) is sparse:
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” Pace
Justice Black, the literal meaning of the clause is both vague and ambiguous.13 What is “freedom of speech”? What constitutes an “abridging”
of freedom of speech? Context enriches this content in various ways.
The clause itself contrasts speech with press, assembly, and petition. The
First Amendment is structurally related to the original Constitution,
which includes a scheme of limited and enumerated congressional powers, and the Ninth Amendment that forbids constructions of the Constitution that deny or disparage rights retained by the people on the basis
that other rights (including the freedom of speech) are enumerated.14
And the First Amendment was ratified in a particular historical context
some of which was shared by the members of Congress that proposed the
Bill of Rights, state legislators who voted on ratification, and by “We the
People,” the citizenry of the United States. This publicly available con12. Kepa Korta & John Perry, Pragmatics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2011), http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/pragmatics/.
13. JEFFREY D. HOCKETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
HUGO L. BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND ROBERT H. JACKSON 3, 98–107 (1996); Justice Black and
the Bill of Rights (CBS television broadcast Dec. 3, 1968), available at 9 SW. U. L. REV. 937, 938 (1977)
(quoting Justice Black as saying “Well, I’ll read you the part of the first amendment that caused me to
say there are absolutes in our Bill of Rights. . . . Now, if a man were to say this to me out on the street,
‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion’—that’s the first amendment—I
would think: Amen, Congress should pass no law.”).
14. U.S. CONST. amends. I, IX.
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text of constitutional communication may have enriched the meaning of
the phrase “freedom of speech”—giving relatively more clarity and determinacy to a phrase that would be highly underdeterminate considered
out of context. This enriched meaning is the communicative content of
the Free Speech Clause.
Now consider the legal content that is associated with the Free
Speech Clause. Free speech doctrine is substantially more complex and
rich than the meaning conveyed by the text of the First Amendment—
even taking contextual enrichment into account. The legal content of
free speech doctrine includes a variety of complex legal rules—governing
a wide variety of particular topics, ranging from the regulation of billboards to campaign finance and child pornography on the Internet.15
Take billboard regulation as an example: the Supreme Court has articulated what it calls “the law of billboards” as a subset of free speech doctrine,16 but it is clearly the case that the legal content of this body of rules
is not contained in the communicative content of the Free Speech
Clause. Obviously, the law of billboards is not in the semantic content—
neither the word billboard nor a synonym appears in the text. Almost as
obviously, the precise content of the law of billboards is not a logical implication of the semantic content. And when we add the contribution
made by the publicly available context of constitutional utterance, it is
also obvious that the law of billboards was not in the communicative content of the First Amendment: competent speakers of English who were
aware of the publicly available context would not have reliably predicted
the precise contours of the Supreme Court’s billboard doctrine.
The general point is about the contribution that context makes to
communicative content. So far, I have illustrated this point using judicially crafted constitutional doctrine, but the same phenomenon can occur in the political branches with constitutional constructions articulated
explicitly (e.g., in opinion letters or preambles) or assumed implicitly in
both individual actions and settled practices.
More generally, the content of constitutional doctrine is far richer
(i.e., contains more information) than does the communicative content of
the constitutional text. In theory, one might imagine a regime of “super
strict construction”—in which the content of constitutional doctrine is
required to have a one-to-one correspondence with the communicative
content of the constitutional text. In reality, the enormous complexity of
constitutional practice has produced a set of constitutional doctrines that
far outruns the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text.

15. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (establishing constitutional
doctrine governing campaign finance regulation); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
(2002) (establishing constitutional doctrine governing child pornography on the Internet); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (establishing constitutional doctrine governing
communication via billboards).
16. Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 501.
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The Core of Originalism

With the distinction between communicative content and legal content in place, we are now in a position to give a relatively precise statement of the core of originalist constitutional theory. We shall focus on
the core, because originalism is itself multifarious and complex.
Originalism has evolved, both as a mode of judicial practice and as an academic theory. During the course of that evolution, the originalist family
of constitutional theories has included versions that emphasized the original intentions of the Framers, the original understandings of the ratifiers, and original public meaning.17 Despite these variations, the originalist family is united by agreement on two core principles, which we can
call “the fixation thesis” and “the constraint principle.”
The fixation thesis can be stated as follows:
The communicative content of the Constitution (the linguistic
meaning in context) is fixed at the time each constitutional provision
is framed and ratified.
The idea expressed by the fixation thesis is simple, but its full articulation
has two distinct components. The first component is semantic:
The semantic content of constitutional meaning is fixed by linguistic practices at the time each constitutional provision is framed
and ratified.
For example, the phrase “domestic violence” is used today to refer to
spousal abuse, child abuse, and elder abuse within a family, but contemporary usage is not an accurate guide to the semantic meaning of the
same phrase that appears in Article IV of the United States Constitution;
as used in the late eighteenth century “domestic Violence” referred to
riots, rebellions, and other forms of harmful physical force within the territory of a political unit—in context, within the boundaries of a state.18
The first aspect of the fixation thesis is important because meanings
change over time; this is the well-known phenomenon of linguistic drift.19
The second aspect of the fixation thesis goes to contextual enrichment—the contribution of context to communicative content. The context of a particular utterance or writing is fixed in time. This contextual
component can be stated as follows:
The publicly available context of constitutional communication
is fixed at the time the text is framed and ratified.
17. LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist
Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12,
33 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
18. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 37 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic
Originalism 3 (Ill. Pub. L. and Legal Theory Res. Papers Series, No. 07–24, 2008), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. For a clever and utterly implausible argument to the contrary, see
Mark S. Stein, The Domestic Violence Clause in “New Originalist” Theory, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
129, 133–35 (2009). Cf. Jay S. Bybee, Insuring Domestic Tranquility: Lopez, Federalization of Crime,
and the Forgotten Role of the Domestic Violence Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1997).
19. See SOL STEINMETZ, SEMANTIC ANTICS: HOW AND WHY WORDS CHANGE MEANING, at vii–
xiii (2008).
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Before giving examples, we need to note an important clarification. The
context is fixed at the time the text is framed and ratified, but it includes
the entire publicly available context—and that context may itself be
composed of events that predate ratification. The Constitution of 1789
was drafted in 1787 and obtained sufficient votes for ratification in 1788.
Similarly, each amendment is proposed and ratified during a particular
period of time.20 For this reason, the publicly available context of each
provision of the Constitution is time bound. The public context is likely
to focus on communications and events that are close in time to the drafting and promulgation of the text, but events in the distant past could be
important parts of the context to the extent that framers, ratifiers, and
citizens shared the belief they were relevant to the meaning of some constitutional provision. But future events cannot be part of the publicly
available context of constitutional communication—not without time
travel!
In sum, the fixation thesis expresses the idea that communicative
content is fixed in time. The thesis results from two facts about meaning:
(1) semantic content is fixed by linguistic practice at the time of utterance, and (2) the context of an utterance is time bound.
The fixation thesis is the first element of the core of contemporary
originalism. The second element is the constraint principle. The idea of
the constraint principle is simple and highly intuitive:
The communicative content of the constitutional text should
constrain the content of constitutional doctrine.
Although it might be theoretically possible for an originalist to view
originalism as a purely linguistic theory, in practice originalists are concerned with the relationship between original meaning and constitutional
practice, including the content of constitutional doctrine. At a minimum,
originalists believe that the original public meaning of the text should
play some role in determining how courts should decide cases and how
other officials and branches (e.g., the President and Congress) should act.
The role that communicative content plays in determining legal content
and effect can be called its “contribution.” Many living constitutionalists
would agree that the original meaning of the text (if ascertainable)
should play some role in determining the content of contemporary constitutional doctrine—although they may believe that original meaning
can be trumped or outweighed by other factors. Living constitutionalists
of this sort can be seen as affirming a very weak form of originalism.
Theorists who describe themselves as originalists characteristically
believe that the contribution of the text to doctrine should be more robust—the constraint principle is meant to express this core belief in an

20. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution is a special case; it was proposed by
Congress on September 25, 1789, but ratification did not occur until May 7, 1992. See Certification of
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relating to Compensation of Members of Congress, 57 Fed. Reg. 21,187, 21,187–88 (May 19, 1992).
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abstract way that leaves room for differences among the different members of the originalist family of theories.
Together the fixation thesis and the constraint principle express the
core of contemporary originalist thought. These are the ideas on which
almost all originalists agree. As the historical evolution of originalist
thought demonstrates, there is another topic upon which originalists have
disagreed. We can introduce this topic via a question: what determines
original meaning? In this Article, I will focus on one answer to this question—the version of originalism that is sometimes called “original public
meaning originalism” or “the new originalism.”
C.

Public Meaning Originalism

The history of originalism includes a set of variations on the theme
of original meaning. Some originalists have emphasized the original intentions of the Framers, others the original understanding of the ratifiers,
and others the original public meaning of the constitutional text.21 This
Article will adopt original-public-meaning originalism as the model case
of originalism for two reasons. First, public-meaning originalism is the
dominant form of originalism in contemporary originalist scholarship.22
Second, for reasons that I have explored at length in other work, I believe that public-meaning originalism is the best candidate for the correct
or true theory of constitutional meaning.23 In this Article, we shall simply
stipulate that public-meaning originalism serves as a model case of contemporary originalist theory.24
What is public-meaning originalism? Like other originalist theories,
public-meaning originalism affirms the fixation thesis and the constraint
principle. What is distinctive about public-meaning originalism can be
expressed as the “public meaning thesis”:
The communicative content of the Constitution is fixed (1) by
the conventional semantic meaning of the text as understood by
competent speakers of American English and (2) by the contextual
enrichment added by the publicly available context at the time each
provision of the Constitution was framed and ratified.
Thus, the communicative content of the Constitution of 1789 is fixed by
linguistic practice and the publicly available context of the founding era.
Similarly, the communicative content of the Fourteenth Amendment is
fixed by linguistic practice and context in 1866 through 1868.

21.
22.
23.

See SOLUM, supra note 17, at 12, 33.
Id. at 22–33.
See Solum, supra note 18, at 2, 18–19; LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, We are all Originalists Now. in
ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM : A DEBATE 1, 54–64
(2011).
24. The phrase “model case” expresses the idea that public meaning originalism provides a model or instance of originalism. Another version of originalism could have been selected for this purpose.
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The Interpretation-Construction Distinction

One more idea is required to complete our description of originalism. This idea can be called “the interpretation-construction distinction.”25 This distinction marks the difference between two related activities within constitutional practice. The first activity is the discovery of
the communicative content of a legal utterance; I will use the term “interpretation” to name this first activity. The second activity is the determination of the legal content and legal effect produced by a legal text; I
will use the term “construction” to name this second and distinct activity.
The interpretation-construction distinction is an old one in American legal theory, and it has been much discussed recently in constitutional theory,26 but the words “interpretation” and “construction” are also used in
a broader sense to refer to both activities (discovering meaning and determining legal effect). Nothing hangs on the terminology, since we
could describe the interpretation-construction distinction using other
words.27
To understand the significance of the interpretation-construction
distinction for constitutional theory, we need to grasp another, related
distinction from the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics—
the distinction between “vagueness” and “ambiguity.”28 When we communicate via language (written or oral), we use words and phrases that
can be formed into complex expressions using the rules of syntax and
grammar. Sometimes, the smallest meaningful unit of expression is a
single word. Other times, whole phrases carry meanings that cannot be
decomposed into the meaning of constituent words. But whatever the
relevant unit of meaning might be, both words and phrases can be either
vague or ambiguous.
In ordinary speech, the distinction between vagueness and ambiguity is not always observed. The two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, and when this is the case, they both mark a general lack of
what we might call “determinacy” (or “clarity” or “certainty”) of meaning. But the terms “vague” and “ambiguous” also have technical (or
more precise) meanings, such that there is a real difference in their
meaning.
In this technical sense, ambiguity refers to the multiplicity of sense:
a term is ambiguous if it has more than one sense. A classic example is
the word “cool.” In one sense “cool” means “low temperature,” as in,
“The room was so cool we could see our breath.” In another sense,
“cool” means something like “hip” or “stylish,” as in, “Miles Davis was
so cool that every young trumpet player imitated him.” And cool has
25. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming).
26. Id.
27. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95,
96 (2010).
28. Id. at 96–97.
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several other senses—referring to temperament or self-control, to certain
colors, and a lack of enthusiasm (or the presence of skepticism or mild
hostility).
The technical sense of vagueness refers to the existence of borderline cases: a term is vague if there are cases where the term might or
might not apply. A classic example is the word “tall.” In one sense,
“tall” refers to height (of a person or other entity) that is higher (in some
way or to some degree) than average. Abraham Lincoln was tall: at almost 6’4” he was a paradigm case of tall for his time. Napoleon was not
tall, although at 5’6” he was of average height for his time (British propaganda depicted him as short). There are persons who are clearly tall
and clearly not tall, then there are borderline cases: for example, in the
United States in the twenty-first century, males who are 5’11” are neither
clearly tall nor clearly not. Finally, a given word or phrase can be both
vague and ambiguous. Cool is ambiguous, and in the temperature sense,
it is also vague.
How does the distinction between ambiguity and vagueness relate
to the interpretation construction distinction? Consider the case of ambiguity first. Many words and phrases have the property of semantic
ambiguity. That is, when a word or phrase is considered acontextually, it
can have more than one meaning. Consider the thought experiment of a
message in a bottle. You are at the beach and you find a slip of paper
that contains only the word “cool” or the phrase “domestic violence.”
You can guess at the meaning, but you won’t know how the author was
using the word, because you lack information about context. Consider
the same words as they appear in messages that provide additional context: “Hey dude, this message in a bottle thing is totally cool.” Or: “I am
a victim of domestic violence. Please protect me from my father.” The
additional context—in these cases provided by the sentence in which the
message appears—is sufficient to resolve the semantic ambiguity.
In the interpretation of legal texts in general (and constitutional interpretation in particular), ambiguity can usually be resolved by resort to
the publicly available context of communication. In the context of constitutional law (as opposed to arguing about constitutional theory), the
phrase “domestic violence” is unambiguous. We know that it refers to
things like insurrections, riots, and rebellions—not spousal, child, or elder abuse within a family. We can restate this point more formally:
Characteristically, ambiguity in the semantic content of a constitutional text is liquidated by context and hence does not appear in the
communicative content of the text.
Because “interpretation” in the technical sense in which we are using
that word is just the activity that ascertains the communicative content of
a text, it follows that ambiguity in semantic content can usually be resolved by interpretation (so long as the interpreter takes context into account).
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The qualifying word “characteristically” expresses the notion that
there is no guarantee that semantic ambiguity can be resolved by context.
For example, it might be the case that complete information about the
publicly available context of constitutional communication would resolve
the ambiguity, but the relevant evidence of that context is no longer
available because of the passage of time. Another possibility is that the
text is inherently ambiguous. This could occur because the drafters of a
legal text were unable to compromise on some issue. In this situation,
they might choose language that is deliberately ambiguous and hence
cannot be liquidated by resort to context. We can call these special cases
“irreducible ambiguity.”
Now consider vagueness. Recall that if a word is vague, the semantic meaning of the word admits of borderline cases. Hart expressed a
similar idea with his notion of “core” and “penumbra.”29 In the core of
settled meaning, the applicability of the rule to a particular case is clear.
In the penumbra, we have a borderline case—where the application of
the rule is underdetermined by the legal materials that are its source.
Outside the penumbra, the rule clearly does not apply. Related to the
notion of vagueness is the idea of “open texture”: the relationship between vagueness and open texture may be complicated, but for our purposes on this occasion we can treat open texture as a species of vagueness.
Of course, we have recognized that there is a distinction between
communicative content and legal content. From the fact that the communicative content (linguistic meaning in context) of a constitutional
provision is vague, it does not automatically follow that the legal content
is also vague—a vague constitutional provision could have received an
authoritative construction that eliminates the vagueness.
Vague texts characteristically require construction. Of course, there
are a variety of ways in which construction can liquidate ambiguity. A
vague text can be translated into a bright line rule. Or the vague text can
give rise to a multifactor-balancing test, the application of which will resolve the borderline case. Or the law may give a judge or other official
discretion to decide the case by an ad hoc, all-things-considered judgment. Each of these modes of construction is a method by which the
vague legal text can be given determinate legal effect. The take-away
point is:
Characteristically, vagueness in the communicative content of a
constitutional text is resolved by a legal norm that enables determination of the legal content or legal effect of the text.
Because “construction” in the technical sense in which we are using that
word is just the activity that ascertains the legal content and effect of a

29. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 119–20 (1961); see also H. L. A. Hart, Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606–15 (1958).
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text, it follows that vagueness in communicative content is usually resolved by construction—although there may be exceptions.30
III. CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND EXTRATEXTUAL SOURCES
We can now return to our problem: can originalists embrace a partially unwritten constitution? Because the phrase “unwritten Constitution” is unfortunate for our purposes, we can ask this question more
clearly: can originalists embrace extratextual sources of the legal content
of constitutional doctrine and practice? We can address this question in
two steps. First, we need to say something about extratextual sources—
what are they? Second, we need to investigate the role that extratextual
sources can play in constitutional interpretation and construction. When
we have taken those two steps, we will be in a position to give an abstract
answer to our question about originalism and extratextual sources of
constitutional doctrine and practice. After we state the abstract answer,
we will turn to a more particularized inquiry.
A.

Typology: Sources of Constitutional Norms

What are the sources of constitutional norms? That’s a big question. To make it more manageable, we can begin by distinguishing between two kinds of sources, which we can call “textual sources” and “extratextual sources.” We might think of the textual sources as divided
into two categories. The first category consists of contiguous strings of
constitutional text that are marked off as discrete units of constitutional
meaning; we can call these text strings “clauses.” The second category of
textual sources has to do with the properties of the text that emerge from
the ways in which individual clauses relate to one another. We can call
these relationships between clauses “structural features of the constitutional text” or “structure” for short.31
The second kind of source comes from outside the constitutional
text—extratextual sources. At this stage of our investigation, we want to
suspend judgment about the legitimacy of these extratextual sources—we
are merely listing the possible candidates for the role of plausible sources
of constitutional norms. Again, we can categorize the possibilities. One
category consists of foundational documents other than the Constitution
of the United States; examples include the Declaration of Independence,
the Treaty of Paris, and the Articles of Confederation. Another category
consists of documents and records that relate to the Framing and ratification of the original Constitution and its amendments; examples include
The Federalist Papers, Madison’s notes of the Philadelphia Convention,
30. Here is one possible exception: There may be some cases in which contextual enrichment
precisifies a vague word or phrase. That is, there may be cases in which the semantic content contributed by a term is vague, but the communicative content is not vague because the publicly available
context adds precisification—reducing the zone of underdetermination.
31. See infra text accompanying note 64.
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and the records of the ratifying conventions. A third category of possible
sources consists of moral and political values.32 The fourth category is
social norms and values—the content of these norms may correspond to
true propositions of political morality, but this need not be the case. The
fourth category refers to what is sometimes called “ethos”—the positive
morality of a particular political culture. The fifth category is institutional practice. One particularly salient member of this category consists of
judicial decisions and opinions—that is, “precedent.” But the practices
of nonjudicial actors could also serve as a source of constitutional norms;
sometimes the term “historical practice” is used to describe a subset of
this category. Finally, the logical space of extratextual sources includes
the idea that constitutional law might simply be “made up” by some official; judges come to mind.
Our typology is summarized in Table 1, which appears immediately
below:

32. This third category—moral and political values—raises certain worries about the use of the
word “source,” because some legal positivists may believe that moral facts cannot determine legal content. Let us set aside positivist worries about use of the word “source” to describe the role that political morality could play in determining the content of constitutional norms; if you wish, you can substitute “constitutional actors’ beliefs about moral and political values.” The third category is described in
terms of the values themselves (or the officials’ beliefs about them).
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TABLE 1: SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS
From the Constitutional Text (Textual Sources)
th
Clauses
Commerce Clause, the 11
Amendment, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.
Structure
The structure of the Constitution
or its parts, e.g., the relationship
between the grants of power in the
first three Articles.
Outside the Constitution (Extratextual Sources)
Other Foundational Documents
The Treaty of Paris, the Declaration of Independence, the Articles
of Confederation, State Constitutions, “Superstatutes”
Documents and Records Relating Madison’s Notes, the Ratification
to the Framing and Ratification of Debates, the Federalist Papers,
the Antifederalist Papers
the Original Constitution or its
Amendments
Moral and Political Philosophy
Consequentialism, Deontology,
(Values)
Virtue Ethics, Social Contract
Theory, Justice as Fairness, Popular Sovereignty Theory
Social Norms and Values
Systems of belief and associated
behavior, shared beliefs about morality and politics, popular beliefs
about the actual or ideal content
of constitutional norms
Institutional Practice
Judicial decisions, legislation and
statutes, rules, practices, and informal norms of Congress and the
Executive branch, also the analog
of these at the state and local level
Discretion
The discretionary decisions of officials, including judges and executive branch officials
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Three Roles for Extratextual Sources in Constitutional Interpretation
and Construction

Our typology provides a rough and ready categorization of the possible sources of constitutional norms. Our next step is to focus on the extratextual sources and investigate the roles they might play in the activities of constitutional interpretation and construction. Let’s begin with
the role that such sources might play in interpretation.
1.

Extratextual Evidence of Meaning (Communicative Content)

Interpretation aims to recover the communicative content of the
text in context. In some cases, the interpretive enterprise is easy. We
can discern the semantic context of the text because we are competent
speakers of the natural English language; in many cases, the semantic
content of the Constitution is easily accessible because the words and
phrases used at the time the provision was drafted have the same meanings today. Frequently, we know enough about context without investigation. But in other cases, the meaning of the text will be relatively inaccessible. The meaning of the words may be unfamiliar, or we may need
to know more about context.
Extratextual sources can aid interpretation. First, extratextual
sources can provide evidence of the conventional semantic meaning of
the words and phrases that comprise the constitutional text. Evidence of
the meaning of the phrase “legislative power” might be found in the Federalist Papers or in the institutional practices of the Continental Congress
or the early Congresses of the United States. An understanding of the
ethos of the founding era might aid in discerning the meaning of the
phrase “freedom of speech,” or we might look to the legal practice of the
founding era for an elucidation of the notion of “freedom of the press.”
Of course, if we are original public-meaning originalists, we will be looking for two particular kinds of evidence—evidence of conventional semantic meanings or evidence of enrichment from the publicly available
context of communication.
2.

Extratextual Contributions to Constitutional Constructions Bound to
the Text

The Constitution of the United States includes a variety of provisions that are general and abstract; some of these are vague or opentextured. These provisions may have a core of settled meaning, but to
the extent that they are vague, they will have a penumbra—the space of
possible cases where the communicative content of the text underdetermines legal content and effect. We can call this space, “the construction
zone.” In the construction zone, the linguistic meaning of the text cannot
tell us how to decide particular cases. Constitutional construction that
goes beyond translation of communicative content into legal content will
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be required. 33 When constitutional construction operates within a construction zone created by the constitutional text, we can say that the construction is “bound to the text.”34
Theories of constitutional interpretation provide an account of the
communicative content of the constitutional text. Theories of constitutional construction are different—they are normative theories about
what we ought to do with that content. Characteristically, originalist
theories of constitutional construction will respect the constraint principle—they will only sanction constructions that are consistent with the
communicative content of the text. In easy cases, construction may take
place without resort to extratextual sources—the text may be sufficient
to provide the legal content that resolves the cases.35 But in hard cases,
even originalists may resort to extratextual sources to provide legal content.
Consider the First Amendment freedom of speech. Because the
text is general, abstract, and vague, we are in the construction zone. In a
particular case, more than one outcome may be consistent with the
communicative content of the constitutional text. If we look to free
speech doctrine as a whole, there are multiple versions of the doctrine
that are consistent with the communicative content of the doctrine. This
means that we will need to look outside the four corners of the text and
the publicly available content of constitutional communication to resolve
at least some possible cases that could arise under the First Amendment
freedom of speech.
For example, we might attempt to formulate a theory of free expression that gives more definite content to the phrase “freedom of
speech.” In formulating that theory, we might consider a variety of extratextual sources. We might look directly to more general theories of
political morality: Ronald Dworkin advocates a method of this kind.36
Or we might look to the political morality of the founding generation—
the free speech ethos of late eighteenth-century America. Or we might
instead look to the free speech values that characterize America today.
33. Solum, supra note 25.
34. The phrase “bound to the text” is being used in a stipulated sense. Constructions that are
bound to the text are stipulated to be constructions that operate within the zone of underdetermination created by vague or irreducibly ambiguous terms.
35. In some cases, this will mean that the legal content of constitutional doctrine will be sufficiently determined by the communicative content of the text to determine the outcome of the case. In
such cases, the activity of construction consists in translating the communicative content of the text
into the equivalent legal content (or constitutional doctrine). These are likely to be “easy cases,” and
because they are easy, the activity of construction may go unnoticed or seem automatic. See Solum,
supra note 25.
Here is an example: Article One provides that each state shall have two senators. U.S. CONST.
art I, § 3, cl. 1. Because senators are human beings, borderline cases do not arise. Senators Boxer and
Feinstein are two senators—not one or three. Constitutional construction is at work here—the constitutional practice (which determines legal effect) is to follow the original meaning of the Constitution.
It could be otherwise; someone might advocate for an amending construction that reapportioned the
Senate by population. But on this particular issue, living constitutionalists and originalists are united
in (tacitly or consciously) endorsing the constraint principle.
36. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
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Or we might attempt to discern the theories of freedom of speech that
were implicit in the institutional practices of the Founding Era.
This Article does not explore the justifications for originalism. Rather, the Article simply assumes an originalist perspective (with public
meaning originalism as the model case). But when it comes to originalist
theories of constitutional construction, the underlying justification for
originalism can and likely will make a difference. Theoretical consistency will demand that the originalist theory of constitutional construction
cohere with the underlying normative justification for the constraint
principle. If the constraint principle is justified by an account of popular
sovereignty, then the theory of constitutional construction must be consistent with popular sovereignty (in light of other relevant political values). If the constraint principle is justified by rule-of-law considerations,
then the theory of constitutional construction must be consistent with the
rule of law (or departures must be justified by other salient political values).
Thus, the requirement of theoretical consistency has implications
for the way in which particular originalist theories treat the various categories of extratextual sources. If the constraint principle were justified
by rule of law consideration and a distrust of the institutional capacity of
judges to make objective morally-correct decisions, then the theory of
constitutional construction would do well to avoid a reliance on the judges’ own beliefs about political morality. If the constraint principle is justified by popular sovereignty theory, then it might follow that the social
norms and values of “We the People” today should play a role in constitutional construction. Of course, these are only toy examples—working
up a full-fledged theory of constitutional construction cannot be accomplished on this occasion. The toy examples are provided for illustration
only—to show how the requirement of theoretical constraint might operate for particular versions of originalism.
3.

Extratextual Sources of Constitutional Norms Not Bound to the Text

We have just considered the possibility that extratextual sources
might be used to flesh out the content of constitutional constructions that
are bound to the text. But it is at least theoretically possible that there
might be constitutional constructions that are “freestanding” or “unbound”—that cannot be connected to the zone of underdetermination
created by a particular clause or to the structure of the Constitution as a
whole or in part.
To illustrate this idea, we can pursue a counterfactual hypothetical.
Suppose that the Constitution had absolutely nothing to say about unenumerated rights. Imagine, for example, that the Ninth Amendment
had not been ratified and that the Fourteenth Amendment did not contain any provision with communicative content that provides a textual
basis for unenumerated rights. (Suppose for example the Fourteenth
Amendment had not included “due process,” “equal protection,” or
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“privileges or immunities.”) Could originalists nonetheless endorse constitutional constructions that created judicially enforceable unenumerated rights?
The answer to this question will depend on the content of the particular version of originalism. Originalism’s two core ideas, the fixation
thesis and the constraint principle, do not tell us whether unbound unenumerated rights are permissible. Although the general formulation of
the constraint principle itself does not answer our question, there are
particular versions of the constraint principle that do. Consider the view
that we have dubbed “super strict construction.” On that view each and
every judicially enforceable rule of constitutional law must directly translate the communicative content of the constitutional text: this version of
the constraint principle might be called “constraint as equivalence.” At
the opposite end of the spectrum, consider a version of the constraint
principle that requires only consistency—constitutional doctrine must
not contradict the communicative content of the text: we might call this
version, “constraint as consistency.” Constraint as consistency would allow for constitutional doctrine that is a superset of those doctrines that
are required by the communicative content of the text. Finally, the constraint principle might be interpreted in light of the notion of boundedness. This version of the principle would limit legitimate constitutional
construction to those constructions that are within the construction zones
created by particular clauses or the constitutional structure: we might call
this version “constraint as boundedness.” So we have three different
versions of the constraint principle, with different implications for the legitimacy of resort to extrajudicial sources that are not bound to the text.
We have now categorized extrajudicial sources and the roles they
might play in the activities of constitutional interpretation and construction. This completes our investigation of extratextual sources at the level
of abstraction. The next phase of our investigation will examine particular sources and the role that they should play in constitutional interpretation and construction—from an originalist perspective.
IV. ORIGINALISM AND EXTRATEXTUAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONTENT
We have now established a theoretical framework that will enable
us to examine the role of extratextual sources in constitutional interpretation and construction from an originalist perspective. Recapitulating
briefly, we have: (1) identified the core of contemporary originalist theory, (2) marked the distinction between interpretation and construction,
(3) identified the construction zone, (4) categorized extratextual sources,
and (5) specified the different roles that these sources might play in constitutional interpretation or construction. We can now apply this framework to particular types of constitutional argument. In each case, we will
examine the type and then consider its relationship to the proper attitude
of originalism toward the use of extratextual sources in constitutional interpretation and construction.
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Constitutional Implications

The Constitution may “imply” things that it does not say. Let us
call the content that is implied but not stated “constitutional implication.” Some theorists treat constitutional doctrines that are derived or
discovered by “implication” from the constitutional text as examples of
an unwritten constitution. For example, Akhil Amar, in his book America’s Unwritten Constitution, suggests that we “read between the lines of
the Constitution—to see what principles are implicit in the document,
read as a whole, even if these principles are nowhere explicitly stated in
any specific clause.”37 The word “implicit” is the adjective form of the
verb “implied” and the corresponding noun “implication.” An “implication” is a conclusion that can be drawn from something, although it is not
explicitly stated.
In this section we are investigating “constitutional implication.” Before we proceed further, we should note a terminological difficulty. The
term “implication” can be used to refer to a variety of linguistic phenomena. For example, “implication” may be used as a synonym for “logical
implication” or “entailment.” But we might also use the word “implication” to refer to certain forms of contextual enrichment: in the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics special terminology is used to
distinguish the distinct phenomena covered by the umbrella word “implication.” Thus, implication can be distinguished from “implicature,” 38
“impliciture,” 39 and so forth. More on those below, but for now we shall
stipulate that the word “implication” is used to refer to logical implication or entailment.
Everyone understands that legal texts have logical implications. We
can express these implications in simple syllogisms:
Premise 1: “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State.”40
Premise 2: Alaska is a state.
Conclusion: ∴ Alaska is entitled to two senators.
The text of the Constitution does not mention Alaska, but from
what the text does say and from the true factual premise that Alaska is a
state, we can imply that Alaska is entitled to two senators.
This account of constitutional implication is not quite right. The
first premise is a quote from the text of Article I and the Seventeenth
Amendment. Premise two is a fact. The conclusion is a rule of law.
Strictly speaking, the argument needs an additional step or two—which
move from the text to the communicative content and then to the associated legal content. We can easily imagine an expanded version of the
syllogism that fills in the missing steps.
37.
38.
39.
40.

AMAR, supra note 5, at xv.
See infra text accompanying note 41.
See infra note 45.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 1.
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What is absolutely clear is that originalism should endorse constitutional implication as a general method of constitutional construction.
Constitutional implications are not in the text, but they follow from the
text.
B.

Contextual Enrichment

We have already introduced the idea of contextual enrichment. For
public-meaning originalists, the public meaning of the text is produced by
the semantic content of the text as enriched by the publicly available context of constitutional interpretation. Contextual enrichment happens in
various ways, and a complete typology is outside the scope of what can
be accomplished on this occasion. Nonetheless, it is important to note
that some forms of contextual enrichment may be called “implications”
in ordinary English. But since we are limiting the use of the term “implication” to the stipulated sense of logical implication or entailment, we
need a richer vocabulary to describe some of the forms of contextual enrichment.
On this occasion, we shall investigate one form of contextual enrichment, which we shall call “implicature,” using the word coined by the
philosopher Paul Grice.41 One way to get at the notion of implicature is
to distinguish it from implication. Here is how Kent Bach expresses the
distinction:
The difference [between implication and implicature] is fundamental. If a sentence is true, what it implies must be true, whereas a speaker can utter a true sentence and implicate something
false. For example, you could say that there’s a gas station around
the corner and falsely implicate that it’s open and selling gas (maybe it’s closed for the night or maybe there’s a gasoline shortage). If
there’s a gas station around the corner, it doesn’t follow that the gas
station is open and selling gas. But it does follow that the gas station is not directly across the street.42
Implications flow logically. Implicatures are communicated by utterances in context. To elaborate, consider the following exchange:
Ben: Where can I buy some gas?
Alice: There is a gas station around the corner.
Alice did not say, “You can buy gas at the station around the corner,” but in context, what she did say creates an implicature to that effect. Or consider the classic example of a letter of recommendation—by
a professor and for a former student who is applying for a tenure-track
faculty position. The letter says, “Ben attended class with regularity, and
was unfailingly punctual,” and nothing else. This statement has no logi41. Wayne Davis, Implicature, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2010), http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/implicature/.
42. KENT BACH, The Top 10 Misconceptions About Implicature, in DRAWING THE BOUNDARIES
OF MEANING: NEO-GRICEAN STUDIES IN PRAGMATICS AND SEMANTICS IN HONOR OF LAURENCE R.
HORN 21, 22 (Betty J. Birner & Gregory Ward eds., 2006).
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cal implications regarding Ben’s suitability for a tenure-track job, but
given the context, the implicature is that Ben is completely unsuitable. If
the best you can say about Ben is that his attendance was regular and
punctual, the implicature is that in other dimensions he must fall woefully short.
Implicature is a general phenomenon that occurs in a variety of
communicative settings, but we are concerned with a special category of
legal implicature, which we can call “constitutional implicature.”43 The
question at hand is whether originalists should endorse the idea that constitutional implicatures contribute to the communicative content bound
to particular constitutional provisions (or to the constitutional structure).
The answer to that question would appear to be “yes.” The version of
public-meaning originalism that we have examined as our model case is
fully consistent with the constitutional implicature as a method for constitutional interpretation. Constitutional implicature goes beyond semantic content; if the meaning of the Constitution were limited to its semantic content, its meaning would be very sparse—we would read the
Constitution as if we knew nothing about the context in which it was
framed and ratified. Depriving ourselves of all knowledge of context
produces a “stripped down Constitution.” We wouldn’t know whether
the Constitution had been adopted in the United States in the eighteenth
century, as opposed to being a fictional constitution in an alternative history novel. We would know nothing of the Articles of Confederation,
the Revolutionary War, or English common law.
The public meaning of the Constitution is not the meaning of the
stripped-down Constitution. For public-meaning originalism, the aim is
to recover the full communicative content of the Constitution—the linguistic meaning as enriched by the publicly available context of constitutional communication. Constitutional implicatures arise from the publicly available context of constitutional communication.
Consider for example, the enumerated power “to establish post offices and post roads.”44 The semantic content of the Post Clause does not
include a power to carry and deliver the mail: only the offices and roads
are authorized. And we cannot get from offices and roads to delivery by
constitutional implication (logical necessity). It is logically possible to
have the former powers without the latter. This is easily demonstrable as
we can imagine a logically consistent version of the postal power that
reads as follows: “Congress shall have the power to establish post offices
and post roads, but the several states shall organize services for the delivery of the mail from the post offices to homes and businesses.”
The power to deliver mail is neither stated explicitly nor logically
implied, but no one doubts that the postal power includes the power to
43. See Solum, supra note 18, at 56–57 (coining the phrase “constitutional implicature”); see also
Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 615, 624–25 (2009).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
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deliver the mail. That power is part of the communicative content of the
Post Clause, because it follows from the clause as a matter of constitutional implicature.45 Precisely this sort of implicature was the basis of
John Marshall’s statement in McCulloch v. Maryland: the explicit power
“to establish post offices and post roads” creates an implicated power “of
carrying the mail along the post road, from one post office to another.”46
As Ryan Williams observes, “Even without the Necessary and Proper
Clause, the implication of such a power would likely have struck most
observers as so natural and obvious that a narrower interpretation denying such a power would have seemed absurd.”47 (Note that Williams is
using the word “implication” in the broad sense that includes implicatures.)
Deep and interesting questions remain for originalists. In particular, originalists should investigate the mechanics and mechanisms of constitutional implicature. In this regard, Williams’s work is pioneering. After recognizing the legitimacy of constitutional implicature,48 Williams
suggests the following criterion:
[I]f the implied content is not semantically encoded in the text,
interpreters should inquire whether a reasonable member of the
ratifying public at the time of enactment would have recognized the
implied content as following obviously and noncontroversially from
the choice of the particular language used in the provision and the
relevant background context.49
Further refinements may be required. The notion of a “reasonable
member of the ratifying public” is a legal notion. But the question that
we are asking is not a legal question—it is a question about meaning. So
we might substitute “competent speaker of American English” for “reasonable member.” Williams uses the phrase “implied content,” but this
usage runs the risk of conflating implication and implicature. We might
substitute, “implicated content.” Williams suggests that constitutional
implicature be limited to content that is obvious and noncontroversial,
but it is not clear that this is the way that implicature always works.
Sometimes the communicative content of a text may not be “obvious”—
45. I am using “implicature” in a broad sense that encompasses a variety of more particular
forms of contextual enrichment. In the case of postal roads and the power to deliver the mail, the precise form of contextual enrichment may be “impliciture”: something that is “implicit” goes without
saying or is implicit in what is said. See Kent Bach, Conversational Impliciture, 9 MIND & LANGUAGE
124–162 (1994).
46. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417 (1819).
47. Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
498, 543–44 (2011). I have adapted the Postal Clause example from Williams’s elegant and important
article.
48. Id. at 544. Williams’s discussion of this point is somewhat misleading given the technical way
that “implication” and “implicature” are used in the relevant literature. He suggests that constitutional implications should be recognized if “the putatively implied content arises as a matter of logical necessity due to a noncancellable, semantically encoded formulation.” Id. This formulation is correct,
but Williams characterizes this principle as a component of a test “for recognizing constitutional implicatures.” Id. That characterization is inaccurate. The logical consequences of semantic content are
implications, not implicatures. See BACH, supra note 42, at 26.
49. Williams, supra note 47, at 544.
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it may be that competent speakers would need to read carefully to see the
implicature. Likewise, the existence of controversy does not automatically cancel an implicature. Interpretation and construction of legal
texts, and especially of the Constitution, involve motivated reasoning;
vested interests or passionate ideologues may create controversy about
implicatures that would be recognized by competent speakers motivated
by a desire to understand the text. As a matter of constitutional interpretation, the question is whether the implicature is correct and not whether
it is disputed.
We might reformulate Williams’s proposed principle as follows:
Constitutional implicatures arise when competent speakers of
the language at the time the constitutional provision was framed and
ratified would draw the implicature from the text given the publicly
available context of constitutional communication.
Further questions remain. Implicature gives rise to special cases of
vagueness and ambiguity. When an implicature has vague content, the
implicature creates a construction zone—the content of the implicature is
not sufficient to resolve the case: constitutional construction will be required. Another possibility is that competent speakers with knowledge
of the publicly available context of constitutional communication would
disagree about what the content of the implicature is. This is a special
case of ambiguity, “implicative ambiguity.” Usually semantic ambiguity
can be resolved by reference to context, in the case of implicative ambiguity, context creates the ambiguity. Of course, it might be the case that
the ambiguity appears when some subset of the publicly available context
of constitutional communication is considered, but resolves in light of the
full context. But it is at least theoretically possible that ambiguity is irreducible, and hence that constitutional construction will be required.
We can imagine a variety of possible approaches to construction
when an irreducible implicative ambiguity exists. We can explore this
problem in the context of its most famous exemplar—the Ninth
Amendment.
C.

The Ninth Amendment

The Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.” We can begin with the
word “construed.” The Ninth Amendment is a rule of construction in
the technical sense. This is not a product of the perhaps fortuitous use of
“construed” which is a form of the same root word as “construction.”
Rather, it follows from the interpretation-construction distinction and
the implication-implicature distinction. The Constitution enumerates
certain rights in Sections 9 and 10 of Article I, in Article IV, and in various amendments, including the first eight provisions of the Bill of Rights,
and subsequent to the Ninth Amendment in various other amendments,
including the Fourteenth Amendment. As a matter of interpretation, the
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enumeration of these rights could not give rise to a constitutional implicature that denied or disparaged other rights retained by the people.
The semantic content of the enumerated rights consists of positive statements about the right in question—freedom of speech, the right to bear
arms, and so forth. The fact of enumeration is a structural feature of the
Constitution. Nothing in the semantic content of the rights contains a
semantic content that explicitly denies or disparages other rights retained
by the people. But it is at least possible that the communicative content
of the enumeration of particular rights gives rise to an implicature that
denies or disparages other rights. The reasoning would go as follows:
The Constitution enumerates a list of particular rights of the
people. The point of enumerating particular rights (and omitting a
more general statement) is to create an exhaustive list. Therefore,
the enumerated rights are the only rights retained by the people.
The semantic content of the Ninth Amendment forbids this form of implicature, and it would forbid this implicature even if the implicature best
captured the public meaning of the Constitution as it would have been
without the Ninth Amendment. But the semantic content does a second
thing. Even if enumeration did not give rise to an implicature of exclusivity, there could be a constitutional doctrine (legal content) that forbade judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights. The reasoning in favor of such a rule of constitutional construction might have proceeded as
follows:
The Constitution enumerates a list of particular rights of the
people. This enumeration could give rise to an inference of exclusivity or it could give rise to an opposing inference that other relevantly similar rights are also protected. This implicative ambiguity
requires constitutional construction. The better construction (for
normative reasons that the reader can supply) is that the list is exclusive. Therefore, there should be a rule of constitutional doctrine
that limits individual rights to those that are enumerated and those
that result by logical implication from the enumerated rights.
The semantic content of the Ninth Amendment forbids this construction50 (and also the interpretation already considered), and hence the
Ninth Amendment is itself a rule of construction.
Thus far we have focused on the semantic content of the Ninth
Amendment, but most of the debate about the meaning of the Ninth
concerns implicature and other forms of contextual enrichment. Again
consider the text: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” The text does not state that the people do have retained rights.
This can be demonstrated by adding the words “if any” to the text as follows: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others, if any, retained by the people.”
50. See id. at 533; see also Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60
STAN. L. REV. 895, 929 (2008).
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The “if any” does not create a logical contradiction. For this same reason, the semantic content of the text does not give rise to a constitutional
implication that the people have retained rights—it is not logically required by the semantic content.
But the Ninth Amendment does give rise to a straightforward constitutional implicature that the people retain other rights. The reasoning
is simple. There would be no reason for the Ninth Amendment if there
were no rights retained by the people; given what the Ninth Amendment
does say and the publicly available context of constitutional communication, a competent speaker of English would draw the implicature. And
hence the implicature is part of the communicative content of the Ninth
Amendment. Given the constraint principle, public meaning originalists
ought not endorse constitutional doctrine that is inconsistent with the
implicature—assuming that no defeasibility condition comes into play.
Having gotten this far, there is a further question: what is the content of the retained rights? Immediately, we see a problem. The constitutional implicature is that there are retained rights, but this implicature
from the Ninth Amendment does not tell us what the content of the
rights might be. Of course, it is possible that the publicly available context of constitutional communication provides sufficient information to
give shape to that content. For example, if that context included widespread public agreement on a theory of natural rights such that competent speakers of American English immersed in the political culture
would understand that “retained rights” were natural rights, then the
publicly shared theory of natural rights might liquidate a substantial
amount of the implicated vagueness. Similarly, if the shared culture included agreement on theories of popular sovereignty or of federalism,
then one of those theories might similarly provide content to the implicature. Many of the debates about the meaning of the Ninth Amendment
should be understood as debates about the content of the publicly available context of constitutional communication.
Suppose, however, that the publicly available context included
competing and only partially articulate views about natural rights, popular sovereignty, and federalism. In that case, the content of the constitutional implicature from the Ninth Amendment might be irreducibly ambiguous. Operationally, this would be the case if different competent
speakers aware of the public context would draw different inferences
about the content of the constitutional implicature or if a single reader
would be undecided about the content of the implicature. Such irreducible ambiguity requires constitutional construction.
But that is not the end of the story. It might be that the irreducible
ambiguity is only partial. Consider the following example: the First
Amendment begins “Congress shall make no law” and hence one might
conclude that the “freedom of speech” binds only Congress—leaving the
executive and judicial branches unrestrained. But the Ninth Amendment
juxtaposed with the First Amendment and publicly available context of
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constitutional communication may give rise to a constitutional implicature that the freedom of speech also constrains action by the executive
and judicial branches. This is simply one example of a more general
phenomenon—irreducible ambiguity in the content of constitutional implicatures can be partial or total. If it is partial, then the constraint principle suggests that originalists should honor that portion of the implicature that is unambiguous.
D.

Extratextual Constructions of Written Clauses

Implicature and the Ninth Amendment are difficult both theoretically and practically, but there are much easier cases. Some provisions of
the Constitution have vague communicative content. For example, the
clauses that vest “legislative,” “executive,” and “judicial power” may be
vague in this way.51 Of course, vague semantic content may become relatively more determinate once context is taken into account, but for many
constitutional provisions, it seems likely that a substantial construction
zone will remain after contextual enrichment.
Different versions of originalism can embrace different theories of
constitutional construction so long as those theories are consistent with
the fixation thesis and the constraint principle—the unifying principles
(or core) of originalism. Some originalists may adopt theories of construction that maximize the authority of the political branches; for example, they might adopt a general rule of construction that calls for judges
to defer to the political branches in the construction zone.52 Other
originalists might look to the judicial practice of the founding era; the
theory that is called “original methods originalism” could serve this purpose.53 And another group of originalists might look to multiple modalities of constitutional argument, including text, history, structure, precedent, “ethos” of the American social order, and prudence.54 The content
of any particular originalist theory of construction will depend on the
underlying normative justification that theory gives for the constraint
principle and a variety of other factors.

51. U.S. CONST. art I, § 1; id. art II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art III, § 1.
52. See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1233 (2012); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
857, 903 n.141 (2009); see also Solum, supra note 25.
53. See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009) (advancing their theory as one of construction and not of interpretation); Solum, supra note 25.
54. The modalities approach is associated with Philipp Bobbitt, who is not an originalist. See
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991). Whereas Bobbitt believes that all
the modalities are relevant to constitutional interpretation (which he does not differentiate from constitutional construction), an originalist might adapt Bobbitt’s approach as a theory of constitutional
construction. See Solum, supra note 25. Stephen Griffin’s pluralist approach to constitutional interpretation is similar to Bobbitt’s modalities account. See Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1753, 1753 (1994).
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Holism and Structure

In America’s Unwritten Constitution, Akhil Amar suggests an approach to what he calls an “unwritten Constitution” and what I call extratextual sources of constitutional interpretation and construction. Although the primary focus of the book is on particularities, he does
articulate a general method:
A single methodological idea unifies all the foregoing case
studies and hypotheticals. On each topic, clause-bound literalism
fails. Sometimes the key clause in isolation is simply indeterminate.
(The phrase “executive Power” can be read narrowly or broadly on
the issue of presidential immunity from prosecution.) Other times,
the most salient clause, in isolation, sends a rather misleading message. (The First Amendment speaks only of “Congress,” but surely
presidents, federal courts, and states must also honor citizens’ rights
to express political opinions.) On occasion the Constitution’s true
meaning is very nearly the opposite of what the applicable clause
seems to say quite expressly. (The vice president does not properly
preside over his own impeachment.) This Article’s unifying idea is
that we must read the Constitution as a whole—between the lines, so
to speak.55
Let us use the name “constitutional holism” for the view that the
meaning of the Constitution is the meaning of the whole document or the
“holistic meaning.”56 What should originalists think about holism?
Public-meaning originalists are committed to the public-meaning
thesis. The communicative content of the Constitution is a function of
contextually enriched semantic content. But what if individual words and
phrases cannot be understood in isolation because the Constitution is an
organic whole? For example, the phrase “rights . . . retained by the
People” in the Ninth Amendment might not be comprehensible without
reference to “We the People” in the Preamble: are “the People” individuals or are they a polity? Likewise, the Ninth uses the phrase “the enumeration of certain rights in this Constitution.” Gleaning the meaning of
this phrase seems to require reference to what is now called “the Bill of
Rights,” and once that has been accomplished, the meaning of the phrase
“rights . . . retained by the People” may be clarified. For example, the
“retained rights” which are not to be denied or disparaged may be of the
same type or kind as the “enumerated rights” such as the freedom of
speech and press, the right to bear arms, the right to due process, and so
forth.
Does holistic meaning provide a better account of the communicative content of the Constitution than does public meaning (as specified
55. AMAR, supra note 5, at 47 (emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism, and Populism, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1657, 1659 (1997) (observing “the importance of looking at the Constitution as a whole, because what was ratified was the document, not individual clauses” and “[t]he clause
is not the unit, or at least the only unit of analysis”).
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here)? To get at this question, we first need to identify and then deflate
a misleading picture of the relationship between the meaning of individual clauses and the whole Constitution. It might be thought that there
are only two alternative positions on the relationship of the whole to the
parts when it comes to constitutional meaning. The first alternative might
be called “clause-bound interpretivism,” which we can define as follows:
The meaning of each clause must be determined from within the
four corners of the clause.
Akhil Amar suggests and rejects this alternative throughout the text
of America’s Unwritten Constitution.57 We can now see that clausebound interpretivism is inconsistent with the public meaning thesis: the
meaning of the Constitution for the public (at the time of framing and
ratification) is a function of both semantic content and context. So public-meaning originalists should reject clause-bound interpretivism.
This brings us to a second theory, which might be called “organicunity holism”:
Meaning only attaches to the whole Constitution as an organic
unity; as a consequence individual clauses are not meaningful units
of constitutional communication.58
This picture, which suggests we must choose between clause-bound interpretivism and organic-unity holism, might be called the “all-ornothing picture”: either the Constitution’s meaning is all holistic (the
whole Constitution all at once) or it is nothing holistic (no meaning attaches to the individual clauses by virtue of their relationship to the
whole document).
The all-or-nothing picture creates a false dilemma. There is an alternative picture of the relationship between the meaning of individual
clauses and the whole Constitution: that picture can be expressed via two
theoretical ideas: (1) the familiar device of the hermeneutic circle, and
(2) the related notion of intratextualism.
The idea of the hermeneutic circle figured prominently in
Protestant theological hermeneutics as a method for understanding the
relationship of the meaning of individual biblical passages to the whole
text: “the meaning of each individual passage of scripture is gleaned in

57. See, e.g., AMAR supra note 5, at 47.
58. Organic unity holism resembles “semantic holism,” a position in the philosophy of language.
Ned Block defines semantic holism as follows:
Mental (or semantic) holism is the doctrine that the identity of a belief content (or the meaning of
a sentence that expresses it) is determined by its place in the web of beliefs or sentences comprising a whole theory or group of theories. It can be contrasted with two other views: atomism and
molecularism. Molecularism characterizes meaning and content in terms of relatively small parts
of the web in a way that allows many different theories to share those parts. For example, the
meaning of ‘chase’ might be said by a molecularist to be try to catch. Atomism characterizes
meaning and content in terms of none of the web; it says that sentences and beliefs have meaning
or content independently of their relations to other sentences or beliefs.
Ned Block, Holism, Mental and Semantic, in ROUTLEDGE ENCYLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (forthcoming 2013),
available at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/MentalSemanticHolism.html.
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light of the meaning of the Bible as a whole.”59 As Gadamer puts it, “For
the whole of Scripture guides the understanding of individual passages:
and again this whole can be reached only through the cumulative understanding of individual passages.”60 Justice Story’s first recommendation
for constitutional construction is based on the same notion: “In construing the constitution of the United States, we are, in the first instance, to
consider, what are its nature and objects, its scope and design, as apparent from the structure of the instrument, viewed as a whole, and also
viewed in its component parts.”61
Intratextualism62 as articulated by Akhil Amar expresses a closely
related idea with a different metaphor:
Textual argument as typically practiced today is blinkered
(“clause-bound” in Ely’s terminology), focusing intently on the
words of a given constitutional provision in splendid isolation. By
contrast, intratextualism always focuses on at least two clauses and
highlights the link between them. Clause-bound textualism paradigmatically stresses what is explicit in the Constitution’s text: “See
here, it says X!” By contrast, intratextualism paradigmatically
stresses what is only implicit in the Constitution’s text: “See here,
these clauses fit together!” But there is no clause in the Constitution that says, explicitly and in so many words, that the three Vesting Clauses should be construed together, or that the Article III
grant of federal question jurisdiction should be read alongside the
Article VI Supremacy Clause. Intratextualism simply reads the
Constitution as if these implicit linking clauses existed. Clausebound textualism reads the words of the Constitution in order,
tracking the sequence of clauses as they appear in the document itself. By contrast, intratextualism often reads the words of the Constitution in a dramatically different order, placing textually nonadjoining clauses side by side for careful analysis. In effect,
intratextualists read a two-dimensional parchment in a threedimensional way, carefully folding the parchment to bring scattered
clauses alongside each other.63
Both the idea of the hermeneutic circle and the idea of intratextualism
undermine the all-or-nothing picture. Our choices are not limited to
clause-bound interpretivism and organic-unity holism. The excluded
middle is to read individual clauses in the context of the whole Constitution. Public meaning originalism squarely occupies the excluded middle:
it insists that the semantic content of individual clauses is enriched by the
publicly available context, and the whole of the constitutional text is in59. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism As Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599, 1608
(1989).
60. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 175 (1975) (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald
G. Marshall trans., 2d ed. 1992).
61. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 136
(abridged ed. 1833).
62. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).
63. Id. at 788 (citations omitted).
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disputably part of that! Moreover, public meaning originalism endorses
the idea that contextual enrichment may occur at the structural level,
that is, the “structural features of the constitutional text.” 64 Once the allor-nothing picture is out of the way, it becomes apparent that contextual
clause meaning can be reconciled with a plausible version of holistic
meaning.
One final point: organic unity holism is utterly implausible as a theory of communicative content. The whole Constitution is not the relevant unit for determining communicative content. It is no accident that
when we apply the Constitution, our focus is on clauses, the interaction
between clauses, and the structural features that form such interactions.
The Constitution as an organic unity says both too much and too little.
Too much, because the whole Constitution from top to bottom considered a single unit of meaning does not translate into rules of constitutional law: organic unity holism makes the Constitution one long primal
scream. Too little, because organic unity prevents us from assigning
meaning at the level of particularity required to do the work of constitutional practice: organic unity holism transforms individual clauses into
meaningless concatenations of phonemes.
In sum, if holistic meaning is construed plausibly (as incorporating
the ideas of the hermeneutic circle and intratextualism) then it is absorbed into public meaning originalism. But if construed in accord with
organic unity holism, holistic meaning is no meaning at all.
Can originalists embrace modest holism? Modest holism can play at
least four distinct roles in constitutional interpretation and construction:
1. Reading parts of the Constitution in light of the whole can resolve semantic ambiguities.
2. Reading parts of the Constitution in light of the whole can reveal constitutional implications—the logical consequences of
the interactions between various clauses.
3. Reading parts of the Constitution in light of the whole can
create or reveal contextual enrichment—in this regard the
whole text acts as context for particular clauses, phrases, or
words.
4. Reading parts of the Constitution in light of the whole can
guide constitutional construction; for example, the relationship between the grants of legislative, executive, and judicial
power in the first three Articles could guide construction of
each.
Originalists can and should endorse modest holism whenever it
plays one of these four roles.

64.

See supra text accompanying note 31.
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Extratextual Fundamental Law

Extratextual sources can play yet another role—as freestanding
sources of fundamental law. The concept represented by the word “freestanding” plays an important role here. We can begin to understand the
notion of “freestanding fundamental law” by way of contrast with two
other ideas: (1) the constitutional constructions that are bound to text
and (2) contextual enrichment of the semantic content of the text. Constructions that are bound to the text are not freestanding—they are attached to text that is vague or irreducibly ambiguous. Contextual enrichments (e.g., constitutional implicatures) provide the communicative
content of the text in context; they do not stand free from the text.
But we can imagine constitutional doctrine that is derived from
freestanding sources. For example, one might believe that fundamental
principles of political morality operate directly to create constitutional
doctrine. The strongest version of this idea would give these principles
of political morality trumping force—they would have legal force even if
directly contrary to the text of the Constitution. Consider an example:
slavery and the slave trade both violate fundamental principles of political morality, but the text of the Constitution arguably prohibited Congress from outlawing the slave trade.65 A more modest version would allow for fundamental law that supplements but does not contradict the
constitutional text. For example, one might believe that there is a principle of political morality that is the source of a constitutional rule forbidding capital punishment—even though the communicative content of the
Constitution does not contain or imply such a rule.66
We have already discussed the Ninth Amendment. Although the
Amendment itself does not directly or logically imply or state that extratextual fundamental law is judicially enforceable, it might be that the
Ninth Amendment creates a constitutional implicature to that effect.
That argument would not be “freestanding” in the sense in which that
term is used here. For the sake of argument, we need to assume that neither the Ninth Amendment nor any other textual source provides a textual basis for the incorporation of extratextual fundamental law.
What should be the stance of originalism toward extratextual fundamental law as a freestanding source of constitutional law? The constraint principle suggests that the strong version of the idea of extratextual fundamental law is inconsistent with originalism. But what about
the modest version? One tempting answer implicitly invokes the idea
that the Constitution is an integrated writing, but where would that prin65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”).
66. Of course, some opponents of capital punishment could argue that a rule forbidding the
death penalty can be derived from the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The argument in text
is based on the assumption that this derivation does not work.
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ciple come from? It is not stated in the constitutional text nor is it logically implied by the text.67 Putting the Ninth Amendment to the side, the
text takes no position on extratextual fundamental law.
Of course, many originalists will believe that extratextual fundamental law is obviously contrary to the normative basis for the constraint
principle. For example, if one affirms the constraint principle because
one believes that judges are untrustworthy and hence should be constrained by the constitutional text, one will be likely to adopt a rule that
prohibits judicial recognition and enforcement of extratextual fundamental law. But this rule itself is not stated in the text. It might be a construction derived from the phrase “judicial power” or it might itself be
derived from a freestanding principle of political morality.
On the other hand, if one’s justification for the constraint principle
were based on a theory of natural rights combined with an argument that
public meaning originalism provided for the best institutional structure
for the protection of such rights, then one might believe that a naturalrights version of extratextual fundamental law is consistent with originalism.
The word “originalism” is a neologism, coined by Paul Brest to describe a constitutional theory that he opposed.68 Some originalists may
believe that the spirit of originalism is fundamentally inconsistent with
the notion of freestanding extratextual fundamental law, and hence freestanding extratextual fundamental law should not be called “originalist.”
Other originalists may insist, with equal fervor, that natural-rights extratextual fundamental law is at the core of the original meaning of the
Constitution. Once we recognize that “originalism” is a stipulated theory
term, it becomes clear that there is no truth of the matter in this debate.
The best we can do is to be clear about the meaning of our stipulated
theoretical language. My own view is that any constitutional theory that
affirms the fixation thesis and the constraint principle is properly called
“originalist,” given the patterns of self-identification of contemporary
constitutional theorists who endorse originalism. The disputes about
freestanding unenumerated constitutional rights reflect dispute among
originalists about the correct formulation of the constraint principle.
G.

Enactment Arguments

One of the most interesting contributions made by Akhil Amar in
America’s Unwritten Constitution is his proposal for a distinctive form of
contextual enrichment. In this section, we shall investigate Amar’s proposal from the perspective of public meaning originalism. Should
originalists embrace Amarian enactment arguments?
67. This can easily be demonstrated. Add an extratextual fundamental law clause to the constitution. The new provision does not contradict or invalidate any of the communicative content of the
constitutional text. It follows that the negation of the imaginary provision is not implied by the communicative content of the actual text.
68. See SOLUM, supra note 17, at 13.
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We can begin our investigation with an explication of Amar’s
statement of his argument. Amar focuses on the ratification process as
the basis for constitutional implicature. He calls this kind of argument
from extratextual sources “argument from enactment” or “enactment argument.”69 Here is Amar’s description:
In the fateful year following the unveiling of the Philadelphia
delegates’ proposed Constitution in September 1787, specially
elected ratifying conventions across the continent enacted the proposal into law, much as the houses of an ordinary legislature might
enact a statute. The specific enacting procedures and protocols that
brought forth the Constitution are rich with meaning. They invite
interpretation.
The sort of interpretation I have in mind here is not interpretation of what the Constitution says as a text, explicitly or implicitly.
Rather, it is the interpretation of how the Constitution became
law.70
In particular, Amar argues that the enactment both provides an independent ground for the freedom of speech and provides that right with
content. His explanation provides further clarity:
The claim is not that free speech generally prevailed on the
ground in postcolonial America. . . . Rather, the special twist is that
the very act of constitutional ordainment itself occurred in and
through a regime of boisterous, virtually uncensored free speech.
In this respect, the argument from enactment history functions like
a standard textual argument, which also focuses tightly on the Constitution itself. But the enactment approach understands the Preamble’s self-reference to “this Constitution” as a deed as well as a
text—a doing, an ordainment, a constituting, a performative utterance. In short, an enactment, reflected in the text itself: “We the
People . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution.”71
And he provides another gloss in an adjacent passage:
To put the point a slightly different way, an enactment argument can perhaps be seen as a textual argument of sorts—an interpretation of the tiny but powerful workhouse word “do” in the Preamble. The argument from enactment prompts us to understand
what was in fact done by the people in the very process of ordaining
and establishing the Constitution. And what was done . . . was a
remarkable embodiment of free speech, speech that was inextricably intertwined with the very deed of ordainment itself.72
And in another passage, Amar identifies yet another characteristic
of enactment arguments:
Enactment arguments also share one of the great strengths of
various classical arguments derived from the Constitution’s general
69.
70.
71.
72.

AMAR, supra note 5, at 54.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 55.
Id.
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structure: a focus on the Constitution as a whole rather than on
some small clause or part. Whereas many standard textual arguments are small-bore and clause-bound, enactment arguments are
panoramic, drawing out attention to how the entire Constitution
came into being. In this sense, an enactment argument is the ultimate structural argument, with a historical twist.73
Finally, he integrates the ideas in the three above-quoted passage as
follows: “Howsoever we classify enactment arguments—whether we view
them as historical, or textual, or structural—we need to see that the written Constitution and the unwritten Constitution cohere to form a single
system.”74
The final passage sheds light on the preceding three, suggesting that
Amar sees three possible understandings of enactment arguments, we
can label them as follows (1) “the historical understanding,” (2) “the textual understanding,” and (3) “the structural understanding.”
These passages are highly suggestive, but they do not make the theoretical structure of enactment arguments transparent. How precisely
does the enactment argument work? In the case of freedom of speech,
the general idea seems to be that the enactment process displayed a conception of the freedom of speech, and therefore the freedom of speech is
(or should be) part of the legal content of constitutional doctrine. Stated
in this way, the argument is enthymematic: the missing premise would
provide a warrant for moving from the fact that ratification of the Constitution was conducted under conditions of free speech to the conclusion
that those conditions (or the conception that best fits them) have legal
force.
What is the missing premise? Consider first the textualist understanding of the enactment argument. Viewed as a textual argument focused on the word “do” in the Preamble of the Constitution, the enactment argument does not go through. Amar correctly observes that the
Preamble uses the word “do” in “We the People . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution” and that it plays a performative function. Implicitly, Amar is referring to speech-act theory, elegantly introduced by J.L.
Austin’s classic, How to Do Things with Words.75 Austin’s key insight is
that utterances have what is called “illocutionary force”—they can make
promises, issue commands, reject an offer, and so forth.76 The Preamble,
when read in conjunction with the ratification provisions of Article VII,77
may constitute an illocutionary act: upon ratification, “We the People”
perform an action, ordaining and establishing this Constitution. The in-

73. Id. at 55–56.
74. Id. at 56.
75. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J. O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., 2d ed.
1975).
76. Id. at 100.
77. U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient
for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”).
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dexical “this”78 (which appears in both the Preamble and Article VII)
makes it clear that ratification ordains and establishes the Constitution
contained in the text in which the Preamble and Article VII appear—the
text contained in the document that was produced at the Philadelphia
Convention and that is now displayed in the National Archives.
Is there a textualist argument for a particular conception of the
freedom of speech based on the meaning of the word “do” or the speech
act of ordaining and establishing the Constitution of 1789? Of course, the
contribution of the word “do” to the semantic content of the Constitution does not include a conception of the freedom of speech—and Amar
could not be charitably interpreted to make a claim that it does. “Do”
does make a contribution to the semantic content of the Constitution:
“do” connects the illocutionary action of ordaining and establishing to an
agent, “We the People.” But this semantic contribution does not include
a conception of the freedom of speech: the semantic content of the word
“do” is both too sparse and too far in conceptual space from freedom of
speech to play this role.
What about the speech act of ordaining and establishing the Constitution of 1789? A full account of the illocutionary force of this act would
be complex and is outside the scope of this Essay. Nonetheless, we can
reach some obvious conclusions about the content of the illocutionary
force. The text of both the Preamble and Article VII clearly refer to
“this Constitution.” As Christopher Green has argued, this use of the
indexical strongly suggests that it is the text of the Constitution of 1789
that was ordained and established.79 If Green is correct, then the textualist understanding of the enactment argument does not support the freedom of speech—unless the freedom of speech can be located in the text
itself. We can bracket the question of whether there is a freedom of
speech in the communicative content of the text of the Constitution of
1789. The crucial point is that the communicative content of the text is
not the entire ratification process. The text is one thing; the ratification
process is another. The text has semantic content; the conception of
freedom of speech displayed by the ratification process does not have
semantic content, although the process can be described in language that
does have such content.
One might argue that the Preamble does ordain and establish Article VII, but Article VII itself does not include a conception of the freedom of speech. I will develop the argument in full, but it seems clear that
the freedom of speech is not part of the semantic content of “The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”80
One might try to argue that a conception of the freedom of speech is
78. See generally Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis
for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607 (2009) (using indexicals to argue the
meaning of the Constitution was fixed at the Founding).
79. Id. at 1660.
80. U.S. CONST. art VII.
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built into notion of a “convention” or “ratification,” but this proposal
seems unlikely to succeed. One way to see this is to imagine a variation
of Article VII that disclaimed such an effect: “The Ratification of the
Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of
this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same. The legislature of each state shall provide such rules regarding the deliberations of
such conventions as it deems fit.” The revised version of Article VII is
not nonsensical, as it would be if the semantic content of “convention”
included the freedom of speech.
Because Amar’s explicit statement of the textualist understanding
of the enactment argument is very brief, it is possible that Amar might
attempt to connect the word “do” to a conception of the freedom of
speech in some other way. The discussion in the preceding paragraph
shows that such a conception is not to be found in the semantic content
of the Preamble or the illocutionary force of the speech act of ordaining
and establishing the Constitution of 1789.
Amar offers two other understandings of the idea of an enactment
argument, which he calls “structural” and “historical.”81 Again, Amar’s
explication is brief and fragmentary, but what he does say suggests that
both of these understandings are contextual enrichment arguments. As
we have already seen, the structure of the Constitution forms an important part of the context of individual clauses. Modest holism, which
embraces the idea of the hermeneutic circle and intratextualism, identifies the distinctive modalities of structural arguments.82
Can enactment arguments be understood as structural in the sense
specified by modest holism? Here, Amar’s move is to argue that the ratification process is part of the Constitution. What does that claim mean?
Amar cannot be charitably construed as claiming that the ratification
process is part of the constitutional text. To begin, the ratification process is not a text, although it includes texts. The various writings and utterances that are part of the process are not part of the constitutional
text. Is there an alternative interpretation of Amar’s claim that the ratification process is part of the text? The most plausible alternative is contextual. That is, we can understand Amar’s structural argument as claiming that the ratification process is part of the publicly available context of
constitutional communication, and hence that ratification can be a source
of contextual enrichment.
This interpretation of the structural understanding of the enactment
argument can be applied to the historical understanding as well. The ratification process is part of the historical context of the constitutional text.
From an originalist perspective, history is relevant for two reasons: (1) it
provides linguistic facts relevant to the determination of semantic content, and (2) some historical facts are part of the publicly available context. The historical understanding of the enactment argument can be re81.
82.

See AMAR, supra note 5, at 56.
See supra Part IV.D.
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constructed as an argument about publicly available context. Of course,
not all of the ratification process was available to the American people in
general. Some parts of the process were behind the scenes and not publicly accessible at all. Some events occurred in meetings that were only
accessible to the participants and those to whom they reported in oral
conversations or private letters. But some of the events surrounding ratification were widely reported and hence publicly available. Let us assume that the “regime of boisterous, virtually uncensored free speech”83
reported by Amar satisfies the conditions for inclusion in the publicly
available context of constitutional utterance.
We can now summarize our progress in unpacking Amar’s enactment argument. Although the argument might be interpreted as making
a claim about the semantic content of the Constitution or about the content of the illocutionary force of the speech act of ordaining and establishing the Constitution of 1789, these interpretations are neither charitable
to Amar nor plausible. The best interpretation of the textual, structural,
and historical understandings of the enactment argument is contextual.
Parts of the ratification process are included in the publicly available
context of constitutional communication, and hence are eligible sources
for contextual enrichment.
Understood in this way, Amar’s enactment argument remains enthymematic. For the argument to be complete, Amar would need to
spell out the specific mechanism by which public awareness of the ratification process created communicative content including the freedom of
speech. One can imagine various ways the argument might go. Amar
might argue for a constitutional implicature: robust freedom of speech
during the ratification process implicates an unstated principle of freedom of speech that should guide construction of the power grants in the
first three Articles of the constitutional text. Or Amar might make an
argument that the ratification process implicitly precisifies vague or
open-textured provisions; perhaps the vague and possibly ambiguous
word “proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause. There may be other
possibilities as well. Because Amar’s statement of the argument is incomplete, it is difficult to assess its validity from an originalist perspective.
The question addressed here is whether originalists can accept enactment arguments as a type—whatever the merits of the particular argument tokens advanced by Amar in America’s Unwritten Constitution.
If the enactment argument is understood as a form of contextual enrichment, then originalists can embrace it; contextual enrichment is a paradigmatic form of originalist argument, precisely because context is one of
the sources of original meaning (understood as communicative content).
Understood in this way, Amar’s contribution is identification of a particular type of contextual enrichment—based on the characteristics of the
process of ratification. Originalists should have no quarrel with the
83.

AMAR, supra note 5, at 55.
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type—although Amar’s particular arguments (e.g., his free speech argument) could be contested on their merits (once they were fully specified).
H.

Nonconstitutional Texts

Should originalists embrace arguments that use nonconstitutional
texts as sources of constitutional doctrine? For example, should originalists embrace arguments that derive the legal content of constitutional
doctrine from the Declaration of Independence, the Treaty of York,
Blackstone’s Commentaries, or the Federalist Papers? Various versions
of these questions have been the subject of vigorous debate. For example, Lee Strang has argued that the Declaration of Independence should
not be viewed as an independent source of constitutional norms,84 but
others, such as Scott Gerber, have argued that the Declaration should
play a robust role.85 For the purposes of this discussion, a “nonconstitutional text” is any text that is not part of the United States Constitution—
the Constitution of 1789 plus all of the subsequent amendments; roughly,
the version of the Constitution in the United States Code.
Akhil Amar has argued generally for a robust role for extraconstitutional texts, which he treats as part of America’s “symbolic constitution”:
America’s symbolic constitution surely includes (but is not limited
to) the Declaration of Independence, Publius’s The Federalist, the
Northwest Ordinance, Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, the Warren
Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board, and Dr. King’s “I Have a
Dream speech.”
These works set forth background principles that powerfully
inform American constitutional interpretation. Wherever the written Constitution is fairly susceptible to different interpretations, interpreters should hesitate, and do in fact hesitate, to embrace any
reading that would violate the clear letter and spirit of these other
canonical texts. In short, these texts are constitutional in the sense
that they are constitutive—adherence to these texts helps constitute
Americans as a distinct people among all the peoples of the earth.86
There is much going on in this passage; examining Amar’s case for
nonconstitutional texts as sources of constitutional law can help us to untangle the various roles such texts might play.
Once again, our question is how nonconstitutional texts should be
viewed from an originalist perspective. We can begin with an easy case
for public-meaning originalists. Some nonconstitutional texts are clearly
part of the publicly available context of constitutional communication.
Such documents include The Federalist Papers and the Declaration of
Independence. Because they are part of the publicly available context,
84. Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A Unique
Role in Constitutional Interpretation?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 413, 414 (2006).
85. SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 3 (1995).
86. AMAR, supra note 5, at 247.
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they can play a role in arguments for contextual enrichment of the semantic content of the constitutional text. Such enrichments might include the clarification of ambiguity, constitutional implicatures, or arguments about implicit content.
Originalists should embrace another role for nonconstitutional
texts. The semantic component of original meaning is fixed by linguistic
facts as they stood at the time each provision of the Constitution was
framed and ratified. Linguistic facts are established or known on the basis of evidence. In the case of very recent amendments, there may be audio recordings that could be the source of evidence about relevant linguistic facts, but for the Constitution of 1789 and most of the
amendments, the relevant linguistic evidence will be provided by nonconstitutional texts—including publicly available documents like The
Federalist Papers, but also including nonpublic documents like diaries,
private letters, and even the nonpublic records of the Philadelphia Convention.
There is a third role for nonconstitutional texts that some originalists may embrace. Nonconstitutional texts might serve as evidence of
what Philip Bobbitt calls “ethos,” the shared values of the American
people.87 Some constitutional theorists may believe that such values
trump the communicative content of the constitutional text, but the constraint principle commits originalists to the view that ethos can play only
a supplementary role. Deploying the terminology of the interpretationconstruction distinction, ethos (as evidenced by canonical nonconstitutional texts) could guide constitutional actors in the construction zone—
but would have no direct relevance to constitutional interpretation. This
view is close to that expressed by Amar, who writes, “True, these special
texts are not on the same legal level as the written Constitution itself.
Where the terse text is clear, it trumps. But often the written Constitution is not crystal clear.”88 To be clear, different originalists have different views about constitutional construction and the constraint principle:
some originalists may reject the idea that substantive values can play a
role in the construction zone; for example, originalists might adopt a
Thayerian rule of construction, deferring to elected officials when the
communicative content of the constitutional text is vague or irreducibly
ambiguous.89
In sum, originalists can embrace three roles for nonconstitutional
texts: (1) if the text is part of the publicly available context of constitutional communication, the text can serve as the part of the basis for contextual enrichment; (2) if the text is contemporaneous with the framing
and ratifying of a particular provision, the text can provide evidence of
linguistic facts that determine semantic content; and (3) if the text pro87.
88.
89.

BOBBITT, supra note 54, at 12–13.
AMAR, supra note 5, at 247–48.
JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25–26 (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1893).
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vides evidence of norms relevant to constitutional construction, the text
may guide the development of constitutional doctrine in the construction
zone.
There is a fourth role for nonconstitutional texts. Some of these
texts, such as the Declaration of Independence or the Treaty of Paris,
could arguably be part of the Constitution. The conventional wisdom in
constitutional theory is that the text is limited to the Constitution of 1789
and the canonical set of amendments recognized in the United States
Code. Analogizing with the Bible, we can label the disputed texts “constitutional apocrypha.”90 How should originalists view constitutional
apocrypha? Originalists, like other constitutional theorists, will need to
answer the question of canonicity: are the apocrypha properly viewed as
part of the constitutional canon? The question whether a particular text
in the aporcypha should be moved into the canon is complex, and outside
the scope of this essay. My guess is that very few originalists will accept
expansion of the constitutional canon. If a particular text were moved
into the canon, then originalists will insist that the (once apocryphal, now
canonical) text be interpreted in light of the fixation thesis: the meaning
of the Declaration of Independence or the Treaty of Paris was fixed at
the time these documents were written. And if they are canonical, then
the constraint principle would apply: constitutional doctrine should (at a
minimum) be consistent with their communicative content.
I.

Precedent

What role should precedent (or judicial opinion) play in constitutional practice?
In particular, how should originalism treat precedent? This is a
large topic on which much has been written.91 One useful way into the
problem is via the interpretation-construction distinction. Interpretation
seeks the linguistic meaning of the text. Construction determines the legal content of constitutional doctrine and the effect of that content in
particular cases.
What about precedent and constitutional interpretation? Originalists are committed to the fixation thesis: the communicative content of
the constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and
ratified. Public-meaning originalists believe that the communicative content is a function of the conventional semantic meaning of the text and
90. See THE NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED APOCRYPHA: NEW REVISED STANDARD VERSION (Michael D. Coogan, et al. eds., 2010).
91. Originalist writing on this topic includes Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as it Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism,
Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437 (2007); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803 (2009); Lawrence
B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 159 (2006); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419
(2006).
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contextual enrichment (by the publicly available context of constitutional
communication). On the surface, these commitments might lead to the
conclusion that precedent should have no effect on constitutional interpretation. If a constitutional precedent correctly identifies and applies
original meaning, then it is redundant. And if a constitutional precedent
departs from original meaning, then the constraint principle would seem
to require originalists to disregard the precedent.
Akhil Amar has concisely expressed the originalist worry about
precedent that departs from original meaning:
If the justices generally felt free (or obliged!) to follow clearly
erroneous case law concerning the core meaning of the Constitution, then the foundational document might ultimately be wholly
eclipsed. Rather than simply filling the document’s gaps, judicial
doctrine would erase its outlines. If the written Constitution indeed
contemplated this odd result, one would expect to see a rather clear
statement to that effect: “This Constitution may be wholly superseded by conceded judicial misinterpretation; all branches are oathbound to follow these misinterpretations.” But the Constitution
says nothing of the sort. On the contrary, it explicitly and selfreferentially obliges all officials to swear oaths to itself, not to conceded misinterpretations of it.92
But this simple picture is misleading. A regime of constitutional interpretation must answer at least two distinct questions. The first question addresses the substantive content of constitutional meaning; publicmeaning originalism has a distinctive answer to this question. The second question concerns the institutional structure by which constitutional
meaning is determined and implemented.
A fully developed version of originalist constitutional practice must
address the second question—specifying which institutions are responsible for determining original meaning and how these interactions will
structure the activity of constitutional interpretation. One institutional
possibility would be polycentric constitutional interpretation: each individual official could make independent judgments about constitutional
meaning. The most extreme version of a polycentric regime would be
radically different than the status quo. For example, there would be neither horizontal nor vertical stare decisis: each judge would make independent judgments about the meaning of the Constitution. In a purely
polycentric regime, executive and legislative officials would have similar
interpretive authority—in the extreme case, disregarding coercive judicial orders that were inconsistent with their individual constitutional
judgments.
But polycentric constitutional interpretation is not the only possible
originalist regime. For example, originalists might adopt the status quo
practice that gives the United States Supreme Court the final word on
questions of federal constitutional law—unless the political question doc92.

AMAR, supra note 5, at 237.
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trine applies. This practice would require lower court judges and other
officials to defer to the Court on questions of constitutional interpretation—even if they believed that the Court had erred. Similarly, the current Supreme Court could defer to its prior self; adopting the doctrine of
horizontal stare decisis to structure constitutional interpretation. So long
as this institutional structure is consistent with the original meaning of
the Constitution, this option is available to originalists. Whether it is the
best option depends on a variety of complex institutional questions—
effects on stability, efficacy in maintaining original meaning, and so forth.
Precedent might also play a role in constitutional construction. For
originalists who embrace the construction zone, nonoriginalist considerations inevitably play a role in constitutional practice when the communicative content of the constitutional text is vague or irreducibly ambiguous. In the construction zone, both vertical and horizontal stare decisis
could structure constitutional doctrine—by definition the construction
zone is the space in which the original meaning of the Constitution underdetermines the legal content of constitutional doctrine.
It should be uncontroversial that originalists can embrace an institutional role for precedent—so long as that role is consistent with the constraint principle. There is, however, a question about the proper role of
precedent that is bound to be controversial. Can originalists accept precedents that are both (1) contrary to original meaning, and (2) decided on
the basis of nonoriginalist concerns? Although some originalists have
argued that Brown v. Board can be justified on originalist grounds,93 suppose that Brown is inconsistent with original meaning and that the opinion in Brown cannot be fairly read as a good-faith attempt to reach a decision consistent with original meaning. Under these circumstances,
would originalists be compelled to argue that Brown should be reversed?
Or consider the New Deal-era precedents that expanded national legislative power and provided the constitutional foundations for the exercise
of legislative, executive, and judicial powers by administrative agencies.94
Assuming that these decisions are inconsistent with original meaning and
that their reasoning cannot be characterized as a good-faith attempt to
respect original meaning, must originalists argue that they should be
overruled?
Justice Scalia has argued for “faint-hearted originalism”—which
reconciles originalism with nonoriginalist precedents on pragmatic
grounds.95 Randy Barnett has forcefully criticized Scalia’s argument.96
This theoretical disagreement can be characterized in terms of the constraint principle. Originalists differ about the precise contours of the
constraint principle. Some, like Scalia, adopt versions of the constraint
93. See Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 458 (1996).
94. See. e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
95. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989).
96. Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. L.
REV. 7, 24 (2006).
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principle with defeasibility conditions that are broad in scope. Others,
like Barnett, believe in relatively narrow defeasibility conditions—
although every originalist is likely to accept that original meaning must
give way in some cases: the Constitution is not a suicide pact.97 When defeasibility conditions come into play, the resulting doctrines are constitutional constructions: legal content of constitutional doctrine that is inconsistent with the communicative content of the constitutional text. The
question whether originalists should adopt broad or narrow defeasibility
conditions is a complex one: the answer depends on the underlying justifications for originalism, broader issues in political philosophy, and empirical questions about institutional design. These topics are important,
but they cannot be resolved on this occasion and are likely to be the subject of ongoing dispute among originalists.
J.

Historical Practice

The final category of extratextual sources of constitutional law to be
examined here is historical practice by the political branches. How
should originalists treat constitutional arguments based on the institutional practices of the President and Congress? Should such practices
have special authority if they were close in time to the adoption of a particular constitutional provision? For example, should the actions of the
first Congress and George Washington have special authority with respect to interpretation and construction of the Constitution of 1789?
These questions can be made more precise by distinguishing the role of
historical practice in interpretation and construction.
Consider first the role of historical practice in constitutional interpretation. In the sense stipulated by the interpretation-construction distinction, interpretation aims to recover the communicative content of the
constitutional text. Direct evidence of communicative content comes
from two sources: (1) evidence of linguistic facts that establish conventional semantic meaning, syntax, and grammar, and (2) historical evidence of the publicly available context of constitutional communication.
Post-ratification practice by the executive and legislative branches do not
provide direct evidence. Such practices are not linguistic facts. And
post-ratification practice cannot be part of the publicly available context
of communication—because such practices occur after the communicative acts (framing and ratification) have occurred.
Nonetheless, historical practice can provide indirect evidence of
original meaning. Suppose that known linguistic facts underdetermine
the meaning of a constitutional provision. A typical case of such underdeterminacy might be ambiguity. A word or phrase in the Constitution
could have two (or more) semantic meanings. The first Congress legislates in a way that is consistent with one of the alternatives, but not the
other. One might infer that Congress’s action provides evidence in favor
97.

Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

SOLUM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 5]

10/21/2013 10:51 AM

ORIGINALISM & THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION

1979

of the interpretation that is consistent with the constitutionality of the
legislation. Of course, this evidence is not decisive—after all Congress
(even the first Congress with members who attended the Philadelphia
Convention and various ratifying conventions) could be mistaken—or
Congress could have failed to recognize the issue or deliberately violated
the Constitution. Nonetheless, early historical practice provides evidence relevant to the resolution of the ambiguity.
How should originalists regard the use of historical practice in constitutional construction? Originalists are committed to the constraint
principle. When the meaning of the text is clear and relevant, originalists
will adopt a construction that aligns the legal content of constitutional
doctrine with the communicative content of the constitutional text. But
in the construction zone, there may be more than one constitutional doctrine permitted by a vague or irreducibly ambiguous text. So originalists
can accept the use of historical practice to liquidate constitutional meaning in the construction zone. Akhil Amar expresses this idea eloquently,
using the phrase “institutional practice” to express the idea we have been
considering using the similar phrase “historical practice”:
First, institutional practice routinely goes beyond the written
Constitution. Second, institutional practice rarely goes against the
canonical document. Typically, the foundational text significantly
constrains even if it does not exclusively control.
In general, the underspecified text and the more specific institutional practices cohere to form a single system of daily governance in which the practices gloss and clarify the text, inducing interpreters to read the otherwise indeterminate text in a highly
determinate way. On a broad set of topics concerning the interactions and internal operations of governmental entities, post-1789 institutional practice thus furnishes a powerful lens through which to
read the 1789 blueprint.98
Amar expresses himself in a slightly different vocabulary than we have
employed. He uses the word “indeterminate” to express the concept we
have labeled “underdetermination.” Amar doesn’t employ the interpretation-construction distinction, but his terms “gloss” and “clarify” are
consistent with the distinction between interpretation and construction.
Originalists can embrace a role for historical practice in constitutional construction. Should they do so? Once again, this is a complex
question and different originalists may approach it differently. Originalists whose normative concerns focus on the rule of law and judicial constraint may welcome historical practice arguments—as they provide a basis for settling constitutional questions. Settlement serves the rule of law
values of stability, certainty, and predictability. Settlement also serves
the function of constraining judges, by providing a basis for decision that
does not require judges to make first-order normative judgments about
the political morality of the settled institutional arrangements. Other
98.

AMAR, supra note 5, at 335.
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originalists may argue that historical practices should play a modest role
because they envision a greater role for normative concerns in the construction zone. And yet other originalists may believe that judges should
generally defer to the political branches in the construction zone; these
originalists may believe that the normative force of historical practice
should be assessed by the political branches and hence that Congress or
the President may depart from such practices without judicial interference.
V. A CASE STUDY: CAN VICE PRESIDENTS PRESIDE AT THEIR OWN
TRIAL BY THE SENATE?
In America’s Unwritten Constitution, Akhil Amar explores a hypothetical case that raises a series of problems for originalism’s commitment to the constitutional text. He posits an impeachment and trial of
Andrew Johnson for high crimes and misdemeanors in 1865, when Johnson was Vice President of the United States. Could Johnson have insisted that he should serve as the President of the Senate and hence preside
at his own trial? Amar suggests that this result is required by the written
Constitution, but that it is clear that the correct constitutional result
would disqualify the President of the Senate from serving in this role.99 If
Amar is correct about the implications of the text and the proper rule of
constitutional law, his hypothetical poses a particular problem for
originalists. Originalists are committed to the constraint principle. If
that principle requires that the Vice President be permitted to serve as
presiding officer in his own trial, but that outcome is clearly unconstitutional, then the constraint principle is wrong. We might then draw the
conclusion that the constraint principle must be modified to take into account an “unwritten constitution”—or to use our preferred terminology,
that extratextual sources should, in some cases, give rise to constitutional
doctrines that are inconsistent with the communicative content of the
constitutional text.
Section Three of Article One of the Constitution provides:
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of
the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he
shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief
Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the
Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.100
Section Five of Article One provides:
99.
100.

Id. at 6–19.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of
two thirds, expel a Member.101
The conjunction of the semantic content of these three provisions
seems to suggest that the Vice President should preside in the case of a
trial by the Senate upon his own impeachment by the House of Representatives. The Vice President is the President of the Senate. The Senate has the power to try impeachments. The Vice President is not disqualified from serving as President of the Senate during a trial for
impeachment. Therefore, the Vice President is constitutionally entitled
to preside at his own trial.
Despite the plausibility of this argument, it not actually the case that
the semantic content of Constitution commands this result. First, the
Constitution does not specify the rights and duties of the Vice President
in his capacity as President of the Senate—with one exception, that he
may only vote if the Senate is equally divided. If an impeachment trial
resulted in an equally divided vote, the Vice President would not be convicted and hence his tie-breaking vote would not be necessary or of legal
effect. It might be argued that the semantic content of the word “President” contains the power to preside at trials for impeachment, but this
argument is implausible. The very fact that the Constitution specifies the
Vice President’s voting rights demonstrates that “President” is an elastic
term. The rights and powers of the President of the Senate could be configured in a variety of ways—so long as the presidency contained a sufficient bundle of rights and powers as to be recognizably presidential in
character. No one thinks that the “President” of Israel is not a “President” because he does not have the same panoply of powers as does the
“President” of the United States. Of course, it is possible that we might
discover linguistic facts that specified presiding over “trial in cases of impeachment” as an essential component of the concept of a presidency,
but this possibility seems remote and unlikely.102
Second, the semantic content of the clause that specifies that the
Chief Justice shall preside in the trial of the President does not either
state or imply that the Vice President shall preside in all other cases. It is
obvious that the clause does not state that the Vice President will preside
in impeachment trials of persons other than the President—those words
or their equivalent simply do not appear in Section Three of Article One.
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
102. An investigation of the relevant linguistic facts is outside the scope of this essay. A preliminary investigation suggests that one of the meanings of “President” is “an appointed or elected head of
any gathering, who presides over meetings and proceedings.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY president, n.2. If “President” is used in this sense, then “presiding” is clearly one of the Vice President’s
functions in his role as “President” of the Senate. But this does not settle the matter, as the Vice President would have this role even if there were a rule that qualified the role in the case of his own trial.
If such a rule existed, it would surely not entail that the Vice President was no longer the “President”
of the Senate, and that fact demonstrates that the semantic content of “President” does not entail the
conclusion that the Vice President must preside in all conceivable circumstances. The Constitution
itself allows for the selection of a President pro tempore, but does not specify the role. U.S. CONST.
art. I., § 3. Moreover, Amar’s hypothetical situation has never come to pass in the actual world.
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It should also be obvious that the clause assigning the presiding role at
trials of the President does not create an implication to that effect. We
need to be careful here. I am using the word “implication” in a stipulated sense—logical implication or entailment. In that sense, there is simply
no argument that Section Three (as it stands) logically implies that the
Vice President shall preside at his own trial. This can be demonstrated
by imagining that Article III stated, “When the Vice President of the
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside.” The amended version would not contain a logical contradiction, and hence the version
without the amended version does not entail that the Vice President shall
preside at his own trial. If this result seems counterintuitive to you, this
is likely because you recognize some form of contextual enrichment
(such as an implicature) to the effect that the Vice President shall preside
in all other cases. We shall turn to contextual enrichment in due course.
At this stage, we are considering only the semantic content of Section
Three and the logical implications of that content.
Third, Section Five of Article One confers upon the Senate the
power to make its own rules. If the Senate made a rule that provided
that someone other than the Vice President should preside if the Vice
President is tried upon impeachment, that would be a rule of the Senate.
We have already seen that this rule would not violate the semantic content of Section Three nor any rule logically entailed by the semantic content.
Our conclusion so far is that neither the semantic content of Article
Three nor its logical implications compel the conclusion that the Vice
President is constitutionally entitled to preside at his own impeachment
trial. It might be argued, however, that this conclusion is required by the
full communicative content of Article Three after contextual enrichment.
The argument would be that although the rights and powers of the President of the Senate are not specified, the text in context suggests this implicitly or through an implicature. The President of the Senate must play
some role, and because the Senate is a legislative body, the obvious role
is that of presiding officer. This implicit assumption might be confirmed
by the assignment of the role of presiding officer to the Chief Justice in
cases of trial—the assumption being that the Vice President would be biased in such a case (because the Vice President would succeed the President if he were removed from office). Moreover, Section Three explicitly recognizes the office of President Pro Tempore, who serves as
President of the Senate in the absence of the Vice President. Doesn’t
this specification assume that the role of the Vice President is necessary
to the functioning of the Senate because otherwise, this provision would
be unnecessary?
There is something to these arguments from contextual enrichment,
but they do not establish the necessary conclusion—that the written Constitution confers a right on the Vice President to serve at his own trial for
impeachment. Precisely because implicit assumptions and implicatures
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are unstated, their content is frequently underdetermined by the publicly
available context of constitutional communication. Suppose that contextual enrichment is sufficient to yield the conclusion that the Vice President ordinarily serves as presiding officer of the Senate—as seems likely.
It is not so clear that it also yields the more particular conclusion that the
Vice President is entitled to serve as presiding officer in his own trial.
Implicit assumptions and implicatures do not work like logical implications—they are frequently underdeterminate and contestable. For this
reason, that portion of the communicative content of the Constitution
provided by contextual enrichment is frequently vague or irreducibly
ambiguous.
Although much more could be said, this seems to be the case with
respect to the Vice President’s right to preside in his own trial. The
communicative content of constitutional text underdetermines the question, opening a construction zone. In this case, the work of constitutional
construction would be done by the Senate itself pursuant to its Section
Five power to determine its own rules of proceeding. Were the Senate to
adopt a rule providing that the President Pro Tempore should preside in
the case of an impeachment trial of the Vice President, that rule would
reflect a reasonable construction of Section Three.
In the end, the question whether the Vice President may preside at
his own trial upon impeachment can be answered plausibly by originalists. This is a case where the text actually says less than a surface inspection reveals. Once we understand the distinction between semantic content and communicative enrichment, the appearance that the
Constitution gives the Vice President the right to be judge in his own
case dissolves. The Senate’s power to adopt rules governing its proceedings would seem to encompass the power to adopt a rule governing the
remote possibility that a Vice President would attempt to preside in his
own impeachment; such a rule would clearly be within the power of
“[e]ach House” to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”
VI. CONCLUSION: OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION
From an originalist perspective, we have a written constitution.
When we engage in constitutional interpretation, the communicative
content of the written Constitution is the target of our investigation. The
meaning of the written Constitution, however, is not limited to the semantic content of the words and phrases. The full communicative content of the Constitution is a function of text and context—and hence of
inferences and implicatures that necessarily involve extratextual sources.
When we engage in constitutional construction, originalism endorses a
principle of constraint: our constitutional constructions must reflect the
communicative content of the text and may not contradict that content.
But when the communicative content of the constitutional text underdetermines the content of constitutional doctrine, we are in the construc-
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tion zone. In that zone, extratextual sources necessarily play a role.
Sometimes the meaning of the text runs out before we know what to do.
From an originalist perspective, constitutional interpretation and
construction necessarily involve extratextual sources, but only when they
are deployed in a way that is consistent with fidelity to the original public
meaning of the U.S. Constitution. We have a written Constitution; we
have constitutional law given shape and content by sources other than
the constitutional text.

